published monthly since 1866

Fortnightly

FOUNDED IN 1865 BY ANTHONY TROLLOPE

LY, 1954 MLI N.S.

NTENTS

ERAL TEMPLER AND MALAYA
COMMONWEALTH AND EUROPE — T. E. UTLEY
A'S FOREIGN POLICY — A CORRESPONDENT IN INDIA
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY IN 1954—Part I. — ASA BRIGGS
AMERICAN FARM SUPPORT PROGRAMME — CLEMENT H. BROWN
RIENDSHIP WITH RUSSIA — WILLIAM C. ATKINSON
WAR BE AVOIDED? Contemporary Opinions XVII—Part I.
FARE FOR THE AGED — ALFRED H. HAYNES
INWARD EYE — NORMAN NICHOLSON
DO WE MOURN?—*A Poem* — LORD GORELL
A LIES WITHIN US—*A Poem* — RAYMOND TONG
E COMICALITIES OF THOUGHT — JOSHUA C. GREGORY

The Fortnightly Library :

UNION OF ITALY — MARGARET CARLYLE

Other Contributors—N. P. Macdonald, Admiral Robert N. Bax, Norman , S. L. Bensusan, Henry Baerlein, F. S. Boas, Sylva Norman, Pennethorne es, Grace Banyard

3S. 6D. or 55 CENTS
DA 60 CENTS

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

42S. PER ANNUM or U.S.A. $6.50 CANADA $7.00

ALL CLASSES
IF INSURANCE
TRANSACTED

MOTOR UNION
INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED
10, ST. JAMES'S STREET, LONDON, S.W.1.

THE FORTNIGHTLY

was founded as an independent review in 1865 *by the novelist, Anthony Trollope. Under its great editor, the historian and political philosopher John Morley, it maintained its traditional independence, offering an arena for the discussion of burning questions—political, social, religious and literary. That independence is maintained to-day. The Fortnightly is connected with no other group or publication. It owes allegiance to no single party or political interest. It is edited for those who need to be well informed.*

JULY 1954

	PAGE
GENERAL TEMPLER AND MALAYA	1
THE COMMONWEALTH AND EUROPE. BY T. E. UTLEY	3
INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY. BY A CORRESPONDENT IN INDIA	8
THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY IN 1954—*Part* 1. BY ASA BRIGGS...	13
THE AMERICAN FARM SUPPORT PROGRAMME. BY CLEMENT H. BROWN...	22
ON FRIENDSHIP WITH RUSSIA. BY WILLIAM C. ATKINSON	27
CAN WAR BE AVOIDED? *Contemporary Opinions XVII—Part I.* ...	34
WELFARE FOR THE AGED. BY ALFRED H. HAYNES	41
THE INWARD EYE. BY NORMAN NICHOLSON	48
WHY DO WE MOURN?—*A Poem.* BY LORD GORELL...	50
AFRICA LIES WITHIN US—*A Poem.* BY RAYMOND TONG	51
SOME COMICALITIES OF THOUGHT. BY JOSHUA C. GREGORY... ...	52
THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY:	
THE UNION OF ITALY. BY MARGARET CARLYLE	60

Other Contributors: *N. P. Macdonald, Admiral Robert N. Bax, Norman Evans, S. L. Bensusan, Henry Baerlein, F. S. Boas, Sylva Norman, Pennethorne Hughes, Grace Banyard.*

¶ Printed by THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW LTD., at 80, High Street, Ashford, Kent. Trade Agents: Horace Marshall & Son, Ltd., Temple House, Tallis Street, London, E.C.4. Editorial correspondence and manuscripts to 50, Liddell Gardens, London, N.W.10.

¶ While the Editor is glad to consider articles offered for publication, he cannot undertake to return MSS. unless accompanied by a stamped envelope.

¶ Entered as second-class matter, January 4, 1934, at the Post Office at New York, N.Y., under the Act of March 3, 1897 (Sec. 397 P.L. & R.).

¶ Registered for transmission by Canadian Magazine Post.

THE FORTNIGHTLY

JULY 1954

GENERAL TEMPLER AND MALAYA

THE British Cabinet may be right to impose democratic government upon the peoples of Malaya. It may tend to pacify the country and reduce communal frictions. But we should not deceive ourselves about it. The demand for elections comes from that tiny fragment of the populace that will want to be elected. Of those eligible to vote few will take the trouble to register. Of those who vote a majority will do so in order to please the District Officer—a good man whose inexplicable whims have to be humoured. Of those who reach the polling booth a high proportion will vote at random and a number will fail to vote at all. The men elected will be the sort of people who seek election. They will be moderately able and moderately honest, but no more able to work miracles than are their nominated predecessors. If they can succeed in making a nation of Malaya it will be less through study of books than through following the example of Sir Gerald Templer. It is he who has shown the way, not by proclamations and directives but by making continual and personal contact with the people themselves.* The Malayan who can first imitate General Templer's direct and personal approach to the poor and the illiterate will be the leader of the future.

Coming from the author of *The Chinese in Malaya* and sponsored as a research project by the Institute of Pacific Relations, Dr. Purcell's latest book† might have been a serious study of Malaya to-day from the Chinese point of view. His criticisms of General Templer, however, reveal a complete misunderstanding of the man: a misunderstanding not only of his very real virtues but even of his quite human failings. Satire to be effective must have a basis in truth but Dr. Purcell is manifestly attacking the wrong man for the wrong reasons. General Templer is not a simple-minded regimental soldier with a fanatical devotion to duty as his only merit. He is a quick-thinking, sensitive Irishman, quite approachable, quite open to argument, imaginative in his approach to

* "But as the initiative passed to the government, the High Commissioner seemed to mellow. 'How's your local council?' he would say. 'Everybody happy? Have you built a school?' Templer's greatest asset was his unsuspected humanity." *Time*, June 7, 1954.

† *Malaya: Communist or Free?* by Victor Purcell. Gollancz. 15s.

the problems of government and legendary in his capacity for work. He has a far more complex character than Dr. Purcell seems to suppose.

If we turn to *Malaya: Communist or Free?* seeking to find what the author's message is, we find it summarized (p. 271) in these words: " The removal of the emergency controls and the holding of elections would allow the Communists to come out in the open again." And if communal differences are mentioned as an obstacle to democracy, Dr. Purcell has this answer: " The cleavages between Malays and Chinese are the outcome of the divide and rule policy of the past British Colonial administrations, but they are not unbridgeable . . . In Malaya under the influence of free institutions communalism would quickly give way to natural class divisions." (p. 273). This conclusion will cause no particular excitement in Malaya. It is, to begin with, perfectly obvious that communal friction has been aroused, first and foremost, by the prospect of British withdrawal. There is now a throne for which to contend. But the fervour with which Dr. Purcell demands free elections would be more impressive if the Government had not already agreed to hold them. Elections are in fact to be held and many of the emergency controls have already been removed.

Where there is still room for disagreement is over the results which the ballot-box may be expected to achieve. The examples of India and Indonesia do not suggest that all strife would be at an end. North Borneo could prove another Kashmir with Malayans as ready to oppress the Dyaks as are the Javanese to deal firmly with the peoples subject to their rule. But, be that as it may, Malaya owes a great debt of gratitude to General Sir Gerald Templer. His methods of dealing with the bandits were certainly, to quote the *Britannica Book of the Year* (1953), " stern and uncompromising " but the results for Malaya have been a great heightening of public morale and, as *Time* (June 7) has said, how Malaya will do without him is " anybody's guess ".

It would be difficult at this stage to assess General Templer's military achievement in Malaya. The emergency is not ended and there may yet be bad as well as good news from that part of the Commonwealth. What can be said is that his military success in 1952 was sufficient to prepare the way for the constitutional progress of 1953-54. It can also be said that his personal example will be, or should be, an inspiration to the elected leaders of the future. His tours through the country, reaching to the remotest villages, number over 120 and wherever he went suspicious and terrified looks gave way to greetings. It will be well indeed if the elected leaders can do as much.

THE COMMONWEALTH AND EUROPE

By T. E. Utley

WHEN the great powers agreed to meet at Geneva to seek settlements in Korea and Indo-China and to examine the future bases of security in South East Asia, they did so in the knowdge, conveyed by the Berlin Conference, that the deadlock in Europe as logically insoluble. The hope was that, in the Far East, there ight be more scope for diplomatic manoeuvre. Although it has been sappointed, it was not an optimistic hope, for in Europe it had been en that there was no scope at all for diplomatic manoeuvre. Western plomacy is engaged in looking for some part of the world where someing new can happen; if any movement at all were possible in the retions of the great powers, the clear-cut conflict of logical opposites in urope might be confused just enough to enable something to happen ere as well. The assumption is still that it is in Europe that a real ttlement must be sought.

The reason for this is plain: it is that Germany holds the balance of orld power. If Russian policy in Germany were to succeed, the ances of a settlement in the Far East would become negligible; if ermany were to be won finally for the west, no gain in the Far East uld be a sufficient compensation for Russia. The attempt to solve the gsaw by turning to the periphery has for the moment failed, and we e back again at the intractable centre. The Far East must now be ought of, as Europe has been thought of for the last four or five years, terms of providing military security against an immediate threat not terms of political solutions.

It is essential, therefore, that the European deadlock, which is the key the general deadlock, should be laid bare and seen clearly through e mass of detail, which the diplomatic need of each side placing the sponsibility for it on the other has brought into being. So long as ermany remains divided, the tension between the west and Russia nnot abate; if Germany is reunited on Russian terms, the balance of orld power will be tilted decisively and, in so far as can be foreseen, rmanently in Russia's favour. The common element of all the ussian proposals in Berlin was the demand for the neutralization of a ermany bereft of all military forces except those deemed necessary r internal security and for immediate defence of frontiers. Obviously, ch a Germany, denied the right to associate with the western powers any circumstances, would exist on sufferance from Russia. These

Russian conditions were clearly and brutally stated. Western diplomacy was not quite under the same necessity of making its conditions clear, but its conditions are none the less real and none the less stubborn. It assumes that the result of free elections in Germany would be an all-German government favourably disposed towards the west, and it is implicit in the western plan that such a government should be free to link itself as closely as possible with western powers through the European Defence Community or directly by membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In that event, the decisive power of Germany would be added to the resources of the west, and the balance would be tilted decisively in favour of the west.

To this dilemma, logic holds one solution. It is the emergence of a Germany at once strong enough to defend itself and play its part in the world, and not irrevocably committed to either east or west. It is true that it is the Soviet Union which is seeking to impose formal limitations on the freedom of German diplomacy after reunification; it is equally true, however, that in Soviet eyes it appears that the west can avoid imposing such limitations only because it is sure of the outcome of a free German diplomacy and sure that it will be fatal to eastern policies. The west is almost as firmly committed as the Soviet Union to a rigid diplomatic conception, the conception of large-scale international organization, organized permanently for purposes of mutual defence. It is in these terms that western opinion has thought about international affairs ever since the end of the war; nothing is more tenacious than the dominating idea which happens at any moment to govern the diplomacy of a democratic State; nothing is harder than to induce a democracy to examine again the assumptions of its diplomacy, for that diplomacy must be comprehensible and must appeal to a saleable moral idea. Just as French opinion before the last war continued to be committed to the idea that security depended on surrounding Germany with a network of central and European alliances long after these alliances had lost all reality, so western diplomacy to-day is governed by the notion that security is to be achieved only through the permanent maintenance of large-scale international associations bound together by indissoluble links. The all-powerful concept is that of the free world organized for defence, and having a sufficient superiority of force to enable it to negotiate confidently with Russia and her satellites.

The particular form which this conception has taken in western Europe is the idea of the European Defence Community linked closely to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The genesis of that idea has only lately begun to be clearly understood. It arose directly out of the circumstance of France at the end of the war, anxious at once to protect herself against the revival of German power and to see German power revived as a bulwark against the Soviet Union. The simple method by which it was proposed to achieve these ends was the rebuild-

ing of western German power on condition that it should be controlled by western European organization. That organization was to be supranational in character in order to make sure that the control was effective. The idea was invented primarily to satisfy the demands of French security. It commended itself to the dominant section of western German opinion as the only immediate possible means of reviving western German power at all. The policy involved an unprecedented sacrifice of sovereignty, and it could be practical politics at all only if the governments concerned were willing, as they proved to be, to go well in advance of public opinion and to hope for the best. French opinion, however, was from the first troubled by the possibility that western Germany, absorbed in such an organization for common defence, might succeed in achieving ascendancy over it, and, as a counter-poise to German influence, the French looked to Britain. Britain, however, could not supply such a counter-poise, because to participate in a supranational organization of the kind envisaged would involve surrendering the control of her foreign policy, and because that foreign policy depends for its effectiveness ultimately on the continuing support of the Commonwealth which could not be expected to underwrite the decisions of a European parliament.

The main reason for delay has been the awakening of French opinion to the real implications of the plan. Its success depended upon inducing the French parliament and people to accept what amounted, or was originally intended to amount, to a federation of western Europe under the guise of a series of eminently practical arrangements for the more efficient production and distribution of iron and steel and the better organization of western European defence. It was one of the most ambitious enterprises in popular persuasion ever undertaken and so far it has failed. Nevertheless, it has achieved enough success to make the consideration of any alternative practically impossible.

French consent to the rearmament of western Germany now depends on E.D.C. being brought into being. How seriously its federal implications must now be taken is uncertain. What is certain is that its survival, federal institutions or not, depends on the continuing support of governments and peoples. The plan is sufficiently vague or sufficiently flexible to be adapted to a changing public opinion. Its significance is now simply that the existence of E.D.C., whatever its disadvantages, may prove to be is the only foreseeable quick means of enabling western German strength to be rebuilt and western German forces to come under the control of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. British policy must, therefore, go to any extent compatible with our not being absorbed in a European federal system to bring E.D.C. into being. It must also be directed towards keeping the constitutional structure of E.D.C. as flexible as possible.

The necessity for these two immediate objectives is as obvious as the fact

that E.D.C. cannot, in its nature, provide the basis of a European settlement. By common consent, the main ingredient in such a settlement must be the reunification of Germany. Assuming that a united Germany were willing to suffer the permament sacrifice of sovereignty implied in membership of E.D.C., it is abundantly clear that French opinion could not ultimately be reconciled to intimate constitutional relationship with a united Germany having all the resources of both zones. The prospect of such a Germany eventually making E.D.C. into its own instrument would make the French a thousand times more anxious than they are at present. It is just as plain that the Soviet Union could not consent to the absorption of a united Germany in a federal association linked to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and hanging mainly on American support. Here, then, is the dilemma, a dilemma which Soviet policy can easily exploit and is every day exploiting and which consists in the fact that the western powers by claiming to want both E.D.C. and a united Germany are pursuing incompatible policies simultaneously.

In part, it is a dilemma which arises from the rejection by France and western Europe generally of the Commonwealth principle, commended with sometimes injudicious vigour by Mr. Ernest Bevin, of co-operation between free and independent governments unencumbered by a supranational institution. Had this doctrine prevailed over that embodied in E.D.C., it would have been a little easier, certainly in logic and possibly even in practice, to reconcile the aim of German unification with the immediate need for fitting western Germany into some sort of collective organization for defence. It must be observed, in passing, that at the moment when the crucial turn was taken and western Europe embarked tentatively on the federalist path, the Conservative Party, the natural repository of the empirical tradition in British diplomacy, was engaged, under the present Prime Minister's leadership, in the vigorous advocacy of a confused version of federalism. Mr. Bevin, for his part, never put the case for an association of independent governments supplemented by functional institutions in concrete and positive terms, but contented himself with 'blimpish' remonstrances against foreigners and their alien practices. Certain sections of the press for a while advocated, in not very precise terms, the orthodox British line, but, subsequently, yielding to the extraordinary belief derived from the conversations of British journalists with foreign journalists, that the European movement was the spontaneous expression of a deep popular consciousness of Europe and not an expedient for enlisting German forces in the defence of France, changed sides, and began preaching enlightenment to the Foreign Secretary. It is now fruitless to deplore these miscalculations, nor must too much importance be attached to them. Even had the projected association of western Germany with her neighbours been much looser in character, it would still have been objectionable to the Soviet Union. German membership of N.AT.O. is no more or very little more

acceptable to Russia than German membership of E.D.C. The only seeds of hope were those sown by Sir Winston Churchill in a speech last summer in which he generated the idea of a new Locarno, of a guarantee of Russian security against Germany and of German security against Russia. This proposal implies not a neutralized Germany but an independent Germany. It could be realized only if Russia were to renounce, in response to the growing power of the west, the ambition to drag the whole of Germany into her orbit, and only if the west could renounce the ambition to tie Germany irrevocably to itself by incorporating Germany into a large-scale national organization, or, in other words, incorporating her into N.A.T.O. Such an independent Germany, uncommitted but free to engage in specific commitments, would introduce into the diplomatic scene an unpredictable and therefore a dangerous fact. At the best, a block consisting of the Commonwealth and Europe, might contrive at times to maintain some sort of equilibrium between Russia and the U.S.A., to the extent of putting a break on Russia and modifying extremist elements in American policy. At the worst, Germany might hold and manipulate the balance between the west and Russia, or might align herself with Russia; or American opinion, indignant at the abandonment of the notion of collective defence under single leadership, might revert to the Henry Wallace policy of *rapprochement* with Russia on a basis of anti-imperialism. All these are possibilities to be reckoned with, but they are possibilities inherent in any flexible diplomacy.

The factors operating against a flexible diplomacy are numerous and important. They include, for example, the assumption of contemporary military science that any war must be planned in detail in advance and bases established where they will be needed. The western powers cannot be asked to abandon the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but they might conceivably consent to the abandonment of the plan for including Germany in it, provided that German independence were guaranteed by them and German military strength was adequate to holding Russian attack long enough for western assistance to arrive. We are committed, and it is necessary to our safety that we should be committed, to the idea of associating western German military power with the power of the west generally, to a world divided into two. Yet, it is important to recognize that the circumstances which make that commitment inevitable for the present include the conversion of western opinion sometimes under British leadership, to rigid diplomatic conceptions based on the idea that the supreme end of diplomacy is absolute security, and on failure to appreciate that absolute security is incompatible with freedom of manoeuvre. If the Commonwealth has anything to offer the world, it is scepticism of organization and the belief in empirical diplomacy, but that contribution it has ceased to make.

(*The author is a leader writer of a national newspaper and a student of international politics.*)

INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

By a Correspondent in India

SEVEN years form but a moment in the history of a nation, but they are long enough to discern the principles and interests on which its foreign policy is based. Any such effort at analysis is made easier in the case of India by certain peculiar factors. In 1947 India, as a new entrant into the comity of nations, was unencumbered by precedents; and there was among her political leaders only one who had a wise understanding of international affairs. The foreign policy of India has been the policy of Jawaharlal Nehru. He it is who steers India through the rocks and whirlpools of the modern world; and his advisers and civil servants have little influence on his decisions. And yet, as the recent debates in India's two Houses of Parliament have shown, his policy in its fundamentals expresses the general sense of the country and has the support of all parties. A clean slate to write on, a single individual to write, and an almost unanimous acceptance as to what is to be written—these are advantages that have all the difference between clarity and confusion.

The strength of Mr. Nehru's policy has lain in the fact that he has based it firmly on the great traditions of India. The tolerance, non-violence and detachment which mark the history of India have, when translated into foreign affairs, become co-existence, love of peace and non-alignment. India does not believe that any particular way of life has a monopoly of virtue, and is prepared to see Russia and China tread their own paths. As the general elections of 1952 made clear, Communism has made little headway in India; and the efforts of Mr. Nehru's Government to build up the buttresses of democracy have been both more perceptive and more effective than those being made in many other parts of the world. The determination to seek prosperity without abandoning civil liberties is all the more creditable as China is striving for the same goal through other methods, and any failure on the part of India will have far-reaching results in Asia. There are in fact many ways of tackling Communism; and proving the efficacy of democratic values would seem more purposeful than proclaiming the military strength of the non-Communist powers, especially as the only alternative to co-existance is universal destruction. It is obvious that few men outside South Korea and Formosa to-day want war; but for Asia, as Mr. Nehru has said, peace is not merely a fervent desire but " an emergent necess-

ity" for it is peace alone that enables that economic reconstruction on which Asia's future depends. All men want peace, but Asians need it more badly than others; and that is why India has become a sort of Quaker in international politics, struggling to find for every problem, if not a solution, at least a compromise, and in every local war, if not an armistice, at least a cease-fire. For love of peace is not love of passivity: uncommitted to either side in the cold war, India judges each case on its merits, and plays, as her troops in Korea have shown, a positive rôle whenever the opportunity offers. Non-alignment is not neutrality. India has never failed to identify an aggressor, and has never feared to speak the truth as she sees it.

These views, however unpalatable, have compelled attention because they are those not of a country but of a continent. The countries of Asia, whatever their differences amongst themselves, have a sense of shared interest. Asianism is a force in international politics, and is much more real than Europeanism or Americanism. Its ingredients are a deep dislike of colonialism, a firm belief that freedom from foreign exploitation is more important than the nature of the internal government, and a determination to receive recognition and treatment on equal terms. Whereas many in the West see in Indo-China only another theatre of the cold war, to the Asian mind it is French imperialism that is the primary issue. And this dislike of colonialism is no geographical concept confined to Asia alone. One of the most significant developments of recent years has been the growing fraternity between Asia and Africa. At Colombo the five Prime Ministers drew attention to Tunisia and Morocco, and authorized the Indonesian Prime Minister to investigate the possibilities of an Asia-Africa conference. Mr. Nehru, ignoring the invective of Dr. Malan, has repeatedly drawn attention to the dangers of the African situation. It is particularly melancholy to see Great Britain committing once again the mistakes she made in India and in Ireland; the Colonial Office, for instance, is preparing for Sir Keith Hancock in Buganda a reception similar to that which Sir John Simon received in India over 25 years ago.

But it is in its attitude to China that Asianism has proved its vitality. Even countries like Burma, which have *prima facie* much to fear from the possibilities of Chinese Communism spilling over its borders, are anxious that the People's Government should occupy the seat reserved for China in the United Nations. Strange as it may seem, there is no group or party in India that has been alarmed by the recent agreement over Tibet which has openly brought the Red armies to the northern frontiers of the country. For the Indian outposts in Tibet were the achievements of British imperialism, and no-one now wishes to retain these legacies of evil at the expense of an Asian neighbour. Chinese sovereignty over Tibet had always been recognized *de jure*, and everything should be done to convert it into reality. If the Chinese maintain

a government that is dictatorial, that is their business. The assurances in the preamble of the treaty between India and China that the two countries will respect each other's sovereignty may sound pious wishes to the West, but are taken seriously in India. For after all, Chinese Communism is as much Chinese as it is Communist; and it is incredible that China could ever, like the apostate Japan of the 'forties, wish to impose herself on her Asian neighbours. Naïveté perhaps; but it is a naïveté to be reckoned with. The close friendship between the independent governments of Asia is a major premiss of modern diplomacy.

At Geneva we have at last seen a *de facto* recognition of China as a great power. But even so, India remains the spokesman of Asia. Burma follows her lead. The recent purchase by India of rice which she did not require at a price which would ensure Burma's solvency is an indication of the intimacy of their association. Indonesia regards India as the sponsor of her independence. Ceylon is sensitive to India's size and strength, but is inexperienced in foreign affairs and is generally content to accept tacitly her guidance. With Pakistan relations are strained, and that country has despite India's protests sought and secured military aid from the United States. The result has been that a settlement in Kashmir is further away than ever before. When last year Mr. Mahomed Ali suddenly came to power in Pakistan, the two Prime Ministers established cordial personal relations and after a series of talks in London, Cairo and Karachi an end of the dispute seemed within sight. It was agreed to nominate a Plebiscite Administrator before the end of April 1954; and even the dismissal of Shaikh Abdullah, Chief Minister of Kashmir, while it inflamed public opinion in Pakistan, did not destroy this agreement. Mr. Ali came to Delhi and received a reception the like of which he had never received even in his own capital. But towards the end of the year there were rumours of Pakistan seeking military assistance from the United States; and when these were proved true India contended that the whole basis of discussions had been destroyed. It is indeed obvious that these arms and planes received from the United States will be used by Pakistan if ever fighting flares up in Kashmir again. True that President Eisenhower has assured Mr. Nehru that he will see to it that this assistance is only utilized in self-defence, but, as has been proved so often, it is difficult to draw the line between defence and attack. Nor, when one considers the control that has been exercised over Syngman Rhee, is it possible to have much confidence in the supervision of the United States. Rumours have already been flying round Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, that unless Kashmir accedes to Pakistan, atom bombs will be dropped. India does not believe that China plans to attack Pakistan, and is convinced that the fear of Communism in Washington has been used by Pakistan to bolster up her own position in her quarrel with her neighbour. India is still committed to a plebiscite and is prepared to honour this pledge when the proper atmos-

phere is restored; but this, it must be admitted, seems very remote, and meantime she cannot abandon her responsibility for the administration of that part of Kashmir which is under her control. The recent decision to bring the government of this region formally into line with that of the rest of India has been widely criticized as a violation of India's commitments. It, however, merely regularizes what in practice has long prevailed and is no more than an interim administrative measure. But all said and done, the fact remains that India has failed to establish friendship with her nearest neighbour, and the harm that this has done to both countries cannot be minimized. Yet the recent Colombo Conference puts things in their proper perspective. Whatever the real desires of the Pakistani Government, it was not prepared to dissent from the general principles of Asian sentiment. The Colombo conference was a triumph for Mr. Nehru. His statement of hopes and fears was accepted by all, and proved to the world that when India speaks, she speaks for free Asia.

But a spokesman requires platforms, and the nature of India's policy makes it essential that she should cultivate diplomacy by conference. The meetings of the Commonwealth and the assemblies of the United Nations are of greater significance to her than to most other nations. She is one of the great points of intersection in the world to-day. For long, let it be remembered, she was the only means of communication between China and the West. She is the strongest link between Asia and the Commonwealth. Mr. Eden at Geneva has been in continuous consultation with Mr. Nehru. The co-operation between India and the Conservative Government has been all the more effective because it is based not on ideological sympathies but on a similar reading of the world situation. Sir Winston Churchill was the greatest single influence against the transfer of power to Indian hands, but he was never the man to quarrel with a *fait accompli*, and his relations with the Indian Prime Minister do great credit to both.

Besides Pakistan, India has experienced a temporary failure of understanding only with the United States. In the struggle against exploitation they have always been at one; and under various schemes and programmes dollars have flowed into India and made possible vast plans for economic reconstruction. Where they have totally disagreed is in their analysis of the nature of Communism. India is not prepared to accept that there can be no lasting peace with Russia and China. Attaching little faith to the theories of Marx she even believes that human nature may prevail and Communism may shed its disregard of spiritual and democratic values. The United States does not share this optimism. But on the other hand, she is not, despite much loose talk of "instant massive retaliation", prepared to plunge into war. She is seeking at least short-term settlements, searching for what President Eisenhower has termed a *modus vivendi* between the unattainable and

the unacceptable; and the paths of India and the United States for the time being run parallel. A few Senators may bark; each country may criticize vehemently any particular action of the other; but the two peoples are in fundamentals one at heart, and this unison must in the long run triumph.

Throughout the centuries, right down till our own times, diplomacy was poised on military strength. The greatness of the powers was determined by the greatness of their armies. Napoleon reinforced his demands at the table by deploying his troops. If you annex a country, said Bismarck, you are a great nation; if you withdraw, then you are decadent. And but a few years ago Stalin repeated the hackneyed question: "How many divisions has the Pope?" Judged by these standards of armed might and atomic piles, India counts for nothing—*vox et praeterea nihil*. And yet the voice of India is being heard with respect in the counsels of the world. There has, in fact, been a subtle change in the atmosphere. People count; numbers tell, not merely in determining the size of battalions but in deciding the weight to be attached to opinions; and views, which are obviously shared by millions, when honestly and courageously expressed cannot lightly be set aside. And this affords a gleam of hope.

THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY IN 1954

Part I

By Asa Briggs

"THIS is a book about tomorrow," David Lilienthal began his well-known book on the Tennessee Valley Authority ten years ago.* Tomorrow has now arrived, but it is not the same tomorrow f which he talked, the tomorrow of "dreamers with shovels" or of democracy on the march." Such slogans are dated in the United States f 1954, and even Mr. Lilienthal himself has moved with the times. The contemporary mood does not encourage philosophizing about T.V.A. and a chill wind from Washington often blows over Tennessee. But in Tennessee itself enthusiasm for T.V.A. is still very strong and nfectious optimism about the future drives away many of the doubts nd fears not only of the foreign visitor but also of the more critical merican. It is not so much the visible signs of progress which leave a owerful impression—the dams, the power stations or the test farms—s the lively comments of the people of Tennessee themselves. There re few dissenters. Workers and bankers, business men and farmers re agreed. Only a few lonely voices, like the Taft-Republican editor f the *Knoxville Journal*, echo the opinions of critics in Washington. n the Valley itself it seems absurd to dismiss T.V.A. as "creeping ocialism" and many travellers from the north or west go home to tell heir friends what Senator Knowland went back to tell Congress—that T.V.A. was the greatest boon to private enterprise they had ever seen. The enthusiasm of the people of Tennessee may prove inadequate, owever, to propel T.V.A. forward towards the distant future of which Mr. Lilienthal wrote. The present problems of T.V.A. are big enough o stir fierce political battles; they can never be safely deemed to be ettled, and before this year ends decisions may well be reached which vill modify the whole future of the Valley. The first problem is a urely personal one—at least on the surface. Gordon Clapp, the Chair-nan of the Board of Directors and a former General Manager, who was ue for re-appointment or termination of contract this spring, has not een retained. The change has aroused strong feelings in Tennessee; nore important, it may modify the atmosphere of T.V.A. operations. The danger is not so much the end of T.V.A. as a federal project, but the aralysis of all its new plans for development and the narrowing of its

* David E. Lilienthal, *T.V.A., Democracy on the March.*

horizons.

Even if Gordon Clapp had been retained, T.V.A. would still be faced with urgent problems. Its long-term problems are the same as they were in 1933. They spring from the antipathy of large sections of the electrical power industry and of bigger business institutions, such as the United States Chamber of Commerce. The power lobby is active and its propaganda is bright and efficient. There is no sign that its antipathy will wither away, although it is certain to undergo cyclical fluctuations with changes in political temperature. Such an antipathy forces before the attention of the public some of the main issues concerning the social aspects of economic development, although they are often presented in such a way that social control is identified with socialism. There are other Congressmen who agree with Representative Gwinn (New York) who recently described T.V.A. as " our pet experiment in socialism " proposed by socialists and " Communists that were affiliated with them." Such nonsense on one side is sometimes paralleled by nonsense on the other side. T.V.A. generates its own *mystique* as well as electric power, and the *mystique* requires considerable excesses of language. One feels some sympathy with a utility executive who told John Gunther that what he objected to most was T.V.A.'s " glamor ". He thought—very properly—that a prosaic business man should not have to compete with anything so " romantic ".

* * *

The urgent problems of T.V.A. concern facts and figures rather than romances and doctrines. In the short run, the continued provision of adequate power for the Tennessee Valley area—an area four-fifths the size of England—is a bigger issue than the safeguarding and further development of a social experiment. Pressing economic problems dominate the scene; they are still not fully appreciated.

For many years the critics of T.V.A. claimed that the Authority was building generating capacity too fast—that ultimately there would be a wasteful power surplus. Now it is clear that the danger lies rather in a power shortage which, because of the great Oak Ridge atomic project within the T.V.A. area, may paralyse the national as well as the local economy.

The fear of a power shortage—not at once but in that part of the near future which can be anticipated and planned—is a rational fear based on facts and figures. The increase in the consumption of power in the T.V.A. area since 1933 has been enormous. When Roosevelt launched the organization, the entire area used only one and a half billion* kilowatt hours. Now it uses 25 billion. One industrial establishment alone—Oak Ridge—uses almost half T.V.A's output, while the electric power now required by commercial and industrial customers in the Eastern District alone of T.V.A's power system is greater than the requirement

* U.S. billion = 1000 millions.

of all customers in all districts 20 years ago.

The enormous increase in the demand for power has been brought about by four factors: first the equipment of farms with electrical power, second the growth of industry in a previously agricultural area, third an increase in consumer demand with the new-found local prosperity, and fourth the expansion of the Atomic Energy Commission's facilities at Oak Ridge and new plant at Paducah, Kentucky. Because of the interplay of these four factors, Tennessee and the T.V.A.-controlled areas outside Tennessee face a serious power shortage in a few years. If T.V.A. ceases to expand, it will not only inhibit new development but will prevent existing economic enterprise from operating efficiently.

The new pattern of enterprise in the T.V.A. area shows how profound has been the change in the character of the American South, particularly since 1939. Even without T.V.A. it is likely that Tennessee would have boomed (relatively at least) after 1939, but the boom would have been sharper and more erratic than was the case. By creating T.V.A. as a "depression project" Roosevelt permitted healthier growth and more careful planning of resources. The results have been striking. Between 1930 and 1950 the number of jobs in manufacturing establishments in the T.V.A. area increased by 72 per cent. as against a figure of 41 per cent. for the nation as a whole. The *per capita* income of the region, which was 44 per cent. of the national average in 1930 had risen to 61 per cent. by 1952. While agriculture made striking progress, the share of industry in local income rose far above it. Quite apart from Oak Ridge, enormous new establishments, like the Aluminium Company of America plant, made their home in what had previously been a backward area.

The demand for power is still increasing at a rapid rate. By 1957 T.V.A. will have to supply 28½ billion kilowatt hours a year to the atomic energy plants alone. This is more power than was sold in any one of the 48 states of the United States in 1952, with the exception of New York. Increasing demand by other customers will entail the building of 750,000 kilowatts of new generating capacity each year, the equivalent of seven enormous new Norris dams added each year to the T.V.A. system. Even when industrial needs have been met, agricultural demand is likely to prove heavy, for one farm in ten is still without electricity.

Such enormous power requirements can no longer be met out of hydro-electric capacity. The taming of the Tennessee River must be supplemented by the building of steam plants. T.V.A. acquired its first steam plants from a private utility enterprise in 1939; in 1942 it began operations in the first newly-constructed steam plant of its own. Seven giant plants are now in course of construction, plants designed to raise the capacity of the T.V.A. system to nine-and-a-half million kilowatts by 1956. The amount of coal consumed will have risen from two

million tons a year in 1945 to 18 million tons in 1957. T.V.A. will then be one of the greatest producers of electric power from coal in the United States as well as one of the greatest world producers of hydro-electric power.

* * *

Before the three-man Board of Directors of T.V.A. can embark upon large-scale capital investment projects, it must secure the approval of the Budget Bureau and of Congress. Securing such approval has caused difficulties in the past and during the last year the difficulties have grown considerably. The enormous increase in the scale of T.V.A's operations, particularly since 1945, has made the present administration loath to allow it to grow much further. The Republican 80th Congress led the way six years ago in objecting to T.V.A. appropriating funds to begin one of its large steam plants at Johnsonville. A coalition of "outsiders", who claimed that T.V.A. was stealing industry from Ohio, Pennsylvania and New England, joined hands with "anti-socialists" and representatives of power companies, who argued that the cities and private businesses of Tennessee should build their own steam plant rather than fall back on T.V.A. For ten months there was a delay in the Johnsonville project, and it required a national election and the choice of another Congress to approve the necessary capital investment. As Gordon Clapp put it, "no-one knows how many manhours of productive labour and wages therefor were lost for Tennessee and the nation."

The present Congress is repeating the same manoeuvres as its predecessor, and this time there is no friendly administration to fall back upon. In March a request to start building a new $35 million lock was turned down by the Budget Bureau; subsequently permission was also refused for permission to start work on a new steam plant at Memphis and to add new units to existing steam plants. Permission was refused although Mr. Clapp told a House appropriations sub-committee that there will be a power shortage by 1957 even if the Atomic Energy Commission ceases to take any power from T.V.A.

Such refusals show the serious difficulties of leaving key decisions as to capital expansion to a Committee of Congress. T.V.A. enjoys none of the advantages of an English nationalized industry and many of its disadvantages. Its administration is de-centralized, but its careful estimates of economic need can be over-ruled centrally for purely political reasons. Not even the presence of atomic energy centres in the area has awakened Congress to a sense of the growing power crisis.

Instead four amendments have been suggested which would further weaken the position of T.V.A. A clear limit, it has been suggested, should be placed on the funds T.V.A. can expend for capital development. Secondly, it should be required to pay interest on its power investment, even though it is a federal agency "borrowing" from the

overnment and paying a good return in other ways. Thirdly, a " sole upplier " clause should be eliminated from T.V.A. contracts with dis-ibutors, chiefly municipalities and co-operatives. Fourthly, T.V.A. ould no longer be allowed to control distributors' power rates.

The question of interest on T.V.A. " borrowings " is an old one. .V.A. is not required to pay Federal income taxes. However, all its in-me belongs to the Government; and if a share of T.V.A's power earn-gs were earmarked for income taxes in the same proportion as for ility companies, there would still be enough left over to cover the Gov-rnment's cost of providing the money invested in the power system. Mr. Clapp claims that re-payment charges could be met even if the gency had to pay two to two-and-a-half per cent. on government funds. he answer to the federal income tax question, he argues, is to be found t in arithmetic but in national policy. Congress directed T.V.A. to arge the lowest possible rates for electric power consistent with mak-g the power programme " self-supporting and self-liquidating." The rective has been followed more successfully than was ever contem-ated in 1933. " Profits " from power (that is total receipts from cus-mers minus total operating costs and an allowance for depreciation) ve represented a return of 4.1 per cent. annually on the average net wer investment. The " self-liquidating " aspect of T.V.A's finances as underlined in the Government Corporations Appropriations Bill of 48, which directed T.V.A. to repay all its investment principle over a riod of 40 years.

Although T.V.A. pays no federal taxes, it pays " in lieu of taxes " nual sums to states and countries where it owns power property or rries on power operations. The sums of money involved are probably eater than would be the case if private enterprise managed the system, though there is a legitimate difference of opinion on this point. The mmonsense arguments which T.V.A. has used to justify its immunity om national taxation have never satisfied the private utility companies, hich claim that the federal agency thereby gains an enormous and un-ir advantage over private companies. There is little truth in the arge made by the companies so long as the annual amount which .V.A. contributes to the Government is greater than that paid by the ility companies. If, however, the Government wished to abandon e policy of keeping prices low in the area supplied by T.V.A., it would difficult to justify tax exemption for the federal agency. It would difficult, too, to maintain intact T.V.A's stout commonsense in face arguments like those put forward recently in Mr. Little's book on e price of fuel and power in England.*

The present pricing policy, which has been criticized on most un-phisticated grounds by critics in Congress, goes back to the period of e Great Depression. Economic development was properly felt to

* I. M. D. Little, *The Price of Fuel* (1953).

depend on cheap power: "from the beginning," Mr. Clapp has said, "we have recommended and repeatedly urged that power in abundance must precede industrial development." T.V.A. itself does not distribute its power to retail customers: it sells it to federal agencies, local communities, co-operatives and (three) private companies, which then either use it themselves or distribute it to the public. The power contracts with these distributive concerns contain standard provisions concerning wholesale rates, retail rates and conditions of distribution. One wholesale rate is charged to all distributors however far they may be from the generating plant; the distributors have to agree to use their electric revenue only in the electric business. There are three standard retail rates—the first and oldest is the basic residential rate, the second and third are lower rates for distributors taking large quantities of power. The general policy, it is claimed, "is based on a principle long ago proved in other mass production industries. It assumes that low prices encourage higher sales and that volume of sales can produce a satisfactory level of earnings just as effectively as can high prices."

If a power shortage does develop during the next few years, this pricing policy may have to be abandoned. The Congressional critics have suggested that T.V.A's control of distributors' retail rates should be abolished. This would mean variety instead of uniformity, discrimination between large and small users, and possibly an attempt to squeeze out the individual consumer of certain types of electric power. One Republican suggested recently, for instance, before a House subcommittee, that if T.V.A. is threatened with a power shortage it can forbid the use of its electricity for heating homes in the Valley. His cross-questioning of Clapp brings out some of the issues involved:

Rep. Jonas (N. Carolina): "Could you not cut out some of the power you are selling to residents for heating purposes? Are not the people in several cities in Tennessee heating their residence with electric power?"

Mr. Clapp: "Thousands upon thousands of homes, Mr. Jonas, are heated with electricity."

Rep. Jonas: "You could cut that out, could you not?"

Mr. Clapp: "No, I do not think we could."

Rep. Jonas: "Is not this the most expensive use of power?"

Mr. Clapp: "No, that is a very efficient use of power, a very efficient use of the energy resources of the area."

It is curious to find Republicans, who so often identify themselves with the economics of abundance, taking up such a defeatist position on the question of the possibility of expanding the power resources of the area. On purely political grounds, or rather political grounds which have been well nurtured by economic interest, they are prepared to take up a position as pessimistic as that of Mr. Little in England.* If there were

* Mr. Little wishes to raise the price of coal, electricity and gas in England to equate supply and demand. He takes coal supplies as more or less fixed and stresses the need to economize. Such economies can only be achieved by a pricing policy which permits "rational allocation of productive resources."

a real power shortage in Tennessee rather than an artificial shortage which they themselves are inducing, then the gloomy analysis they present might be better adapted to the situation than are "the depression economics" of 1933, but there is no reason why the gloom need exist at all. There need be no long-run excess of demand over supply if T.V.A. is allowed to build new plant. The problems of T.V.A. and the National Coal Board are not comparable.

* * *

The Republican critics of T.V.A. are anxious to introduce federal taxation, to modify the pricing system, and to talk the language of priorities not because of a sudden access of economic wisdom, but because they are anxious to see "private enterprise" in the power industry "given its fair chance" in Tennessee. There are three very sound reasons, however, why T.V.A. itself deserves a fair chance to expand in present conditions. The first is the simplest. T.V.A. is a going concern, which is at least as efficient as a private company in the task of power production. During the hearings of the House Committee on Appropriations in 1947 the director of the Corporation Audits Division of the General Accounting Office told Congressmen that "T.V.A., which is a profit-making enterprise, although it may not have been basically intended to be, is in excellent financial condition," while Haskins and Sells, a New York firm of certified accountants in a "task force" report to the Hoover Commission in 1949 stated simply that "the Authority is presently earning more than sufficient power revenues to repay the investment in power facilities with interest." The opinions of accountants can be supplemented by the opinions of technicians and engineers. The quality of T.V.A. technical personnel is admitted to be high, as high as that of employees of any front-ranking giant private enterprise. If financial and technical pre-eminence is to be maintained, T.V.A. must be allowed to develop its own capital investment programme on the same lines as a large-scale private business.

The second reason is closely associated with the first. The alternative to expansion by T.V.A. is the development of smaller power concerns, operated by the present distributors or by private firms. If all new power development were left to such concerns, the price of power would increase substantially. Because the T.V.A. system is so large, it is possible to use "indivisible" plants and units of the larger size and efficiency. The Kingston steam plant under construction near Oak Ridge, will be larger than any steam plant in any other part of the world. Large plants make possible capital savings and low operating costs, as is clear from the history of T.V.A. itself. The first steam plant built by T.V.A. in 1942, if built at to-day's prices, would produce electricity at $10 to $20 a kilowatt more than the modern plant at Johnsonville, the units of which have nearly twice the capacity of the 1942 plant. Only

very large-scale new entrants could match the efficiency of T.V.A.

The logical answer to this second point would be for the Republican critics of T.V.A. to ask for the transfer of the whole of T.V.A. to private enterprise. Only the most foolhardy of them are prepared to ask for this, at any rate in public. American policies are determined not by logic but by a mixture of propaganda, bargaining, and political manoeuvre. The critics of T.V.A. know that it would be very difficult to press for the complete transfer of T.V.A., since such a demand would immediately raise the largest possible issues of social as well as economic development. The third and most important reason why T.V.A. deserves a fair chance to expand is that it still operates as a social as well as an economic agency. Navigation improvements and flood control are carried out, in President Roosevelt's phrase, " for the general social and economic welfare of the nation." Fertilizers and forestry, malaria control and provision of new facilities for recreation figure in its programmes as much as the generation of power. T.V.A. stressed the " unified approach to the development of resources "; from the start its dams, unlike the dams of many private concerns, have served three purposes—navigation, flood control, and production of power. As a result the organization has been able not only to conserve resources in the region, but to increase them.

Private power companies eye with increasing jealousy the power plant of T.V.A., but there is little evidence that they are half as interested in its welfare activities. At most they claim that there is much overlapping between T.V.A. welfare activities and those of other agencies—state and federal—and that many of the services planned for the Valley could now be sub-divided among other and necessarily smaller bodies. Such a policy would be as unwise in the social sphere as the sub-division of power production in the economic sphere. As John Gunther has written: " The Tennessee is, or was, an obstreperous, angry river with an angry history; it was long called America's ' worst river '."* It is only since 1933 that it has been tamed by men who confronted it as a whole rather than in unmanageable sections. To reverse basic social policy since 1933 would not be clever either socially or politically, and it is unlikely that the Hoover Commission, which is investigating general problems of water resources and their administration, will sound a full retreat from the policy of unified control of resources first proclaimed by Theodore Roosevelt in the first decade of this century.

* * *

Not all the statements made by T.V.A. in 1954 are completely convincing, but there can be no doubt that the opinion of Tennessee and adjacent states is sufficiently united in its favour to prevent any tampering with its fundamental principles and organization. The relationship between opinion and achievement raises questions which can only be

* John Gunther, *The Story of T.V.A.* (1947), revised 1950.

discussed fully in a second article. The points raised so far all concern the power crisis which will confront the T.V.A. area unless action is taken now. They are not affected by general considerations of the proper balance between federal and private power in other parts of the United States.

When advocates of T.V.A. pass lightly but enthusiastically from the achievements of T.V.A. to the dreams of twenty other T.V.A's, it is they and not the advocates of private power who are forgetting essential items in political and economic equations. T.V.A. was a depression project in a backward area; its methods are not necessarily appropriate to more prosperous times in socially average or superior areas. Furthermore power companies may have learnt from the history of the last 20 years as much as T.V.A. has learnt; where they have not learnt they can be influenced, guided and admonished. In present conditions, when the prestige of the federal government is low, when there are heated arguments about personalities and control, and when government contracts are not always as favourable to labour as private contracts, some of the abstract arguments in favour of public as opposed to private power need to be re-examined critically. Such a general re-examination is not congenial to many of the supporters of T.V.A., nor does it appeal to the advocates of private power, who fail to see that the case of T.V.A. is different from that of power development in the northern states or in the west. Yet it is only by extricating the T.V.A. argument from a mesh of irrelevant charges and counter-charges that the urgency of the present situation can be appreciated. The " tomorrow " of which men should be thinking now is not the distant one of a golden age but the rather grey tomorrow of 1957.

(The author, a Fellow of Worcester College, Oxford, has just returned from the U.S.A. His concluding article will be published in the August number of THE FORTNIGHTLY.)

THE AMERICAN FARM SUPPORT PROGRAMME

By Clement H. Brown

CHANGES in supply and demand of commodities can often come surprisingly dramatically, and this is true even of the more staple crops where one would imagine that the demand factor was relatively constant. We have been treated to many pessimistic forecasts, since the war, of the world's future inability to support its growing population. It is difficult not to share this pessimism, yet in spite of this bleak outlook for the future, there have in recent months been signs of a definite surplus of many farm crops. It was in anticipation of some such change that Great Britain took what then seemed the risk of refusing to continue her membership of the International Wheat Agreement last year. Some doubts were at the time expressed of the wisdom of this. They are rare now, since every major producer of the crop is at present facing a sales problem. The other main food grain, rice, seemed at one time after the war to have already reached the stage of permanent shortage. Yet there too there has been a quick change. Estimates of current crops indicate that world production is an all-time record, and rice prices too have fallen sharply since last autumn.

An acute shortage with high prices exists in the three standard beverages, coffee, cocoa and tea, where rising world consumption really does appear to have strained current production possibilities. But with these exceptions, cotton is the only one of the world's main crops in which prices are higher than they were a year ago. This case of cotton pinpoints one of the main economic dilemmas of to-day. The world shortage is only apparent. It is in fact a combination of limited supplies of the so-called " outside growths " with an unmanageable surplus stock behind the closed walls of the American system. Although cotton is an outstanding case this tendency towards an isolated price system in the United States is seen in a lesser degree in many other products, and draws increasing attention to the rigidity of the mechanisms which cause it.

Here in Great Britain the results of the annual farm price review have given the first concrete indications of world trends. Not that the reductions now announced really measure the changed factors in the situation. Everyone in the farming world is perfectly aware that free prices would have been appreciably lower. The conclusions arrived at are an uneasy compromise between the maintenance of a guarantee and the desire to

duce the burden on the consumer and taxpayer. Every commentator s shown a lively awareness of the reality of the dilemma, but the prob- n faced in Britain concerns finally her people only. In the United ates the strain of over-supply involves the identical domestic dilemma, th an acute tug-of-war between producing and consuming interests, t there is an extra factor added. This is the world repercussions of nerican decisions, which are as important in agricultural economics as y are in political and military spheres. Meanwhile their own un- siness at the present situation is profound, but dismay at the possible ects of any change seems if anything even stronger.

It is a curious paradox that the country of free enterprise has given the most startling example of the economic rigidities which can follow empts to limit the shock of competition. For it was this, rather than y attempts to emulate the despised socialist planning, which was origin- y embarked on in the slump of the early 1930's. The formula used gins with the conception of a parity price for each commodity, a price nich would have the effect of giving one unit of the product considered same purchasing power as it had in an earlier base period. The mmunity Credit Corporation, the organization working the pro- amme, was then empowered to make loans to the limit of a proportion the parity so calculated. The plan was at first assumed to be tempor- y, and the loan percentage was fixed yearly at varying rates depending the actual circumstances. But the whole system of farm supports s brilliantly exemplified the truth of the French proverb " *Ce n'est que provisoire qui dure* ", and the loan percentages too have shown in- easing rigidity. For the four main products of wheat, maize, cotton d tobacco these loans have now crystallized at 90 per cent. of parity, ough the law allows some elasticity in the loans on perishable products.

It is in virtue of this slight freedom of manoeuvre that butter supports re reduced this spring for the new season, a move which lowered the tail price of butter by about ten cents per pound. The move was made sential by the enormous butter stocks held by the Corporation, esti- ated at over 250 million pounds. The fear of deterioration in these ocks imposed an urgent remedy, but equally unwieldy, though less per- nable, stocks are now held of almost all commodities covered by the neme. The truth is that what started as a programme of loans to cilitate orderly marketing has in fact become the purchase of stocks. was inevitable, given the unrealistic height of the support prices fixed. rmers pledge their crops against a loan, in the first instance, and are lly too ready to redeem them if a higher price is obtainable on the ee market. But where, as so often now, it is not, the unredeemed ocks pledged with the Corporation become in effect outright purchases the latter.

By a variety of legal devices attempts have been made to reduce these

burdensome surpluses. These have varied from the provision of butte for school meals to such methods as the supply of wheat to Spain unde a formula in which the wheat will ultimately pay for American base there. In the most elastic possible use of existing laws to make part o these stocks available to friendly nations, the American Governmen combine charity abroad with kudos in farm circles at home, thoug naturally at the taxpayers' expense. In any such guaranteed price pro gramme, as we have seen here at home, it is difficult to separate the vary ing proportions of the cost which the general community bears in each o its twin rôles of consumer and taxpayer. But we may safely identif these two in seeing that their interests are squarely opposed to those o the growers, and it is only the political difficulty of antagonizing the farm bloc which prevents a change. In this matter Democrats and Repub licans watch each other warily to see how political advantage can b gained by any false step from their opponents.

Taking the whole period of the farm support programme since its in troduction in 1933, it is estimated that total losses of over $1,000 millio have fallen on public funds. But this yearly average of $50 millio masks many years, particularly during the war and just after, when ful production really was needed and saleable, and it is only now that th real burden is being acutely felt. At current world prices and curren supports, an annual loss of more than $300 million seems indicated.

The programme provides for a partial limitation of losses by control ling production, farmers being given a choice, when stocks of any cro pass a certain point, of limiting their acreage or losing their supports The fact that their choice of acreage limitation is, rightly, taken fo granted shows how far opinion in the United States is from accepting the logic of free enterprise. The latest example of this is the cuts im posed on the 1954 cotton acreage. Yet in this case the internal strain of planning are also shown. In cotton the pattern of recent years ha been of a particularly rapid expansion in the irrigated valleys of th western states, where in Arizona and California extremely high yield of excellent fibre have been obtained. Since the restriction formul was calculated on the average area grown by each district in earlier bas years, these newer territories were inevitably hard hit, and protested vigorously. As a result, Congress finally approved a modified formul which took these special situations into account, and the total cut is no less than that foreshadowed by the original wording of the law.

In fact, as everyone now knows, such acreage cuts alleviate the situa tion much less than they appear to. For one thing, every farmer obliged to limit his acreage in any crop inevitably cuts out his marginal fields and retains in production his most fertile. In addition, the reduced area allows him to concentrate his care on it, and the combined effort o these two factors automatically tends to raise average yields. Not onl then is the reduction in the final crop not so great after all, but there i

cessarily an overspill in the production of other crops which farmers w as an alternative. Such considerations indicate, as strongly to jective observers in the United States as to those outside, that the basis the whole system is at fault. The fact that these supports are quickly oving intolerable in their present form, or at least at their present vels, is admitted by everyone but spokesmen for the farmers them-lves. Some reduction in the percentages of parity, as a basis for ans, has been frequently mooted, but as strenuously opposed by those terested.

The problem of these farm supports is in one sense a purely domestic ie for the United States but, as we saw above, it is inevitable that cisions taken there have direct effects on the world's economy. They e effects which in my judgment are entirely bad. In considering them e first point to notice is the distortion of what would be the normal tterns of supply. Both by the holding up of stocks in store, at what-er embarrassment to the Commodity Credit Corporation, and by the reage cuts which have become an indispensable part of the programme, her countries are artificially encouraged to make good the loss on the orld's free markets. They are not of course loth to do so. To nodesian tobacco growers, to many non-American producers of cotton, d to wheat growers the world over, American supports are a guarantee at their prices too will remain remunerative.

The reverse of this medal is naturally the enormous cost to consumers these alternative supplies. Sterling prices of commodities get pushed above their dollar equivalent simply because there are artificial short-es on free world markets. This distortion, to my mind, pinpoints the ost serious charge which we can lay against these farm supports. They em to be one of the main bulwarks of world inflation. The general orld price situation has undergone a startling psychological change nce the war. The idea of prices being the natural balancer between pply and demand, a concept which is fundamental to the working of y free system, goes by default. In the wage situation we see this henomenon at its worst. There are interminable arguments about hether any particular wage should go up, or, more modernly, by how uch it should go up. That wages can ever go down now seems un-ard of. It is immediately obvious that a system in which prices can ove only upward makes in the long run for certain and continuing flation.

We therefore in Britain are particularly and directly affected. As large ale importers of food and raw materials the swing of the pendulum ould at the moment be moving distinctly in our favour if stocks were lowed to exert their normal influence on prices. One can only repeat, at any normal use of the price mechanism requires that an over-supply ould be allowed to produce its natural corrective. The situation of

primary producers would not, in this case, be as precarious as might at first sight appear because many of the existing surpluses have resulted from genuine technical improvements in production. In addition to the case, already cited, of the western irrigated cotton zones, there are the wide success of rust-resistant wheats, and the spectacular improvement of maize yields. The latter flow from the general use of hybrid maize seed, following a breeding method which has been specially adapted to the needs of this crop.

It will be seen therefore that the position of American farmers is of some technical strength, cushioning their losses on any reasonable price drop. Maize, too, has a special position in that it is also a farmer's raw material when used, as it so frequently is, as a main cattle food. But in addition to this special case, it must continually be remembered that the producer of any one crop is also an interested party as a consumer of all others. Inflation seems, superficially, in order to hurt no-one, the easy way out. That is its tragic post-war attraction the world over. But that cost of living figures could again fall as well as rise seems an aim worth striving for.

The final objection to the farm supports can be put in its most general form, a form which includes the others, by saying that it is a betrayal of the world free trade ideal. It is an ideal which attracts often, we must admit, lip service only. But it continues to attract that and, I am sure, rightly. Even if the requisite world authorities existed, they would probably be defeated in any attempt to plan where our main raw material and food needs could best be produced. The beauty of a flexible price mechanism is that it carries the burden of such decisions.

That marginal producers are eliminated, and suffer in the process, is an admitted fact of any competitive system. They deserve the sympathy due to business failures anywhere, but consuming interests surely deserve the first priority. Unrealistic protection of the marginal producer will always impede desirable changes in the production pattern, whether between one country and another, or as internal readjustments. Such changes are in everyone's long-term interest, and represent one of the main classical advantages of any free enterprise system. These theoretical points are undoubtedly appreciated by many American economists at their true value. The same moral, in the form of the virtues of multilateral trading, has often been urged by them on others. It is an outstanding pity that vested interests prevent the full logic of the case being put to the test in agricultural production.

(*From* 1921 *to* 1951 *the author worked with the Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture.*)

ON FRIENDSHIP WITH RUSSIA

By William C. Atkinson

TO have disappeared behind the Iron Curtain has come to symbolize to the west the fate that is worse than death. To disappear voluntarily behind it is, in a citizen of the west, to have plumbed the depths at once of treachery and of moral obliquity. Both judgments may well be true, though clearly we can never command all the evidence. The same situations in reverse, that we hail as a win through to freedom, will equally be invested to Soviet eyes with the most sinister connotation; and this we deplore, blaming the Soviet Government for their refusal to let their people realize that we in the west stand, individually and collectively, for the fundamental decencies, including the right of each to live out his life in peace, and that but for its stand in the opposite camp we might well hope in our own day to see those decencies achieved for all mankind. In these beliefs the peoples of the west are ranged solidly behind their Governments, freely elected by them and vowed to the same ends. That the peoples of the U.S.S.R. stand solidly behind their supreme Government, a government equally representative and equally responsive to the popular will, we know to be a myth, for so our free press consistently informs us. Those unhappy millions are victims trodden underfoot by a handful of tyrants in the Kremlin. Could they but know our way of life and regain freedom of movement they would emigrate to the west *en masse*, or at the least, given freedom of action, would overthrow tomorrow the régime that oppresses them and accept gladly our tutelage in the fashioning of a better.

It is as a possible corrective to these views that the opportunity to visit the U.S.S.R. and to move behind the " curtain " is to be esteemed. To the wholly objective visitor, if such there can be, it is a stimulating experience, and on any so privileged there devolves a responsibility to report faithfully on his return on what he has seen. In this most crucial to-day of all fields of international relations there can be no contribution too modest to the cause of understanding. Understanding will not of itself guarantee peace, but we may be assured that there can be no peace without it.

Devotion to peace, or—put at its very lowest—the cult of the term

peace, is the visitor's first and most abiding impression. The peace slogans that proliferate in all public places, airports, railway stations, sports grounds, universities, government offices, hoardings, move initially to cynicism: this is but part of the general indoctrination, the deluding of the people into the acceptance of yet another war, should it come, as a deliberate conspiracy by the warmongers against the best efforts and intentions of their own rulers in the most sacred of causes. Wherever glasses are raised, however, even in private, the first toast is still invariably to peace, and one soon accepts that, however little the issues may have been thought out, the underlying sincerity is not in question. The worker on the collective farm in the far south is at one with the factory-hand in the far north in his conviction that the safeguarding of peace is the supreme issue of our time. Where the last war came close and the scars still remain, the conviction is an obsession. The writer will not soon forget the old woman in a Leningrad factory who poured him a glass of water and, her eyes filling with tears, begged him to "drink to peace"; in the long siege of the city by the Germans, he learnt afterwards, her home had been destroyed, her entire family wiped out. Leningrad does not want to see another war; nor Moscow, though it suffered negligibly in comparison; nor Tiflis, though materially it suffered not at all. Too much is at stake throughout the Soviet Union, with the gigantic social and industrial enterprises now under way, for any one among the millions of its common citizens to contemplate the prospect of another world conflict with equanimity.

These millions in themselves are in fact very like the people of any other country to the west, ordinary men and women working hard—far harder than in the west—to build up their conception of the good life, passionately devoted to their fatherland, firm believers in its greatness and in the rightness of its policies, ready if need be to defend it once again to the last breath while clinging desperately to the hope that the need will never arise. To credit them collectively with malignant designs against what we esteem "the free world", to regard them as lacking somehow in the attributes of our own common humanity, is a mistake that could cost us dear. It does not survive a few days or weeks of personal contacts.

The proof is in the extraordinary friendliness with which the visitor from without the pale is received. The average Russian knows as little of the west to-day as the westerner knows of Russia. He cannot himself travel abroad freely; his press and wireless give him little foreign news, and that tendentious. To meet an individual westerner in the flesh and have opportunity to discuss and appraise a divergent mode of life is to him an exciting, and a reassuring, experience. He will answer the foreigner's every question about his country, with transparent pride, and will ask with genuine curiosity as many more about the foreigner's. And inevitably the one question at the back of his mind

omes to the fore: is the foreigner too for peace? A list of questions ut at a press conference in Moscow to a party from this country as heir visit ended included not one of a political, still less of a contro- ersial, nature. The interest of the Soviet journalists, and presumably f their readers, lay partly in the impression made on the visitor by oviet achievements in education, the arts and popular culture, but in- nitely more in learning how these compared with the position here and n invoking suggestions for the betterment of relations between the two ountries. There is no problem of friendship between the peoples of the J.S.S.R. and of Great Britain, or of any other country prepared to seek . Friendliness is there for the taking.

The problem lies deeper. Peoples do not make war on one another. Governments make war, and leave the peoples to fight it. No type of égime has yet solved the question of democratic control over foreign olicy, and it is here that all the protestations, the so demonstrably sin- ere protestations, of the popular will for peace in the U.S.S.R. fall hort. As with the campaigns for moral rearmament or for religious egeneration in our own country, the argument ends just where we would ave it begin. How is public opinion to shape a nation's conduct of oreign affairs when the Government, with whom immediate responsi- ility must lie, is itself so largely at the mercy of events? The historian n his hindsight attempts to determine the exact moment at which some overnment took the fatal step that led to war. The statesman is for- unate who can recognize that moment and that step at the time; the oresight that would have averted it is rarely his. War to-day can pring from the most diverse and apparently distant causes, even—it is he tragic paradox of our age—from an irreconcilable difference of pinion over how best to preserve the peace.

It is just because nations can drift into a war which neither side vants, and because public opinion to east and west of the curtain is eing conditioned to-day, largely through mutual ignorance, into cquiescence in the inevitability of another war the outcome of which vould leave the distinction between victor and vanquished an empty echnicality, that a larger measure of charity in our international think- ng has become so urgent. Let us assume that the Government of the J.S.S.R., far from planning another war, are instead in the grip of a error lest such come about just as anguished as our own, that this is the explanation of the military preparations that, seeming from London deliberate bellicosity, are in Moscow the mere expression of any govern- ment's first duty, the defence of their country's soil and sovereignty. What steps could the Kremlin reasonably take to reassure western pinion while reassurance is still possible?

To the extent that the ordinary individual moving about the country an form a judgment, the U.S.S.R. has nothing to hide and a great deal o show of which it can legitimately be proud. As much is implicit in

the existence and activities of the U.S.S.R. Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, a counterpart of the British Council but which draws its funds from trade union instead of government sources, from the various "unions of creative artists" in particular. This Society, in inviting to its soil foreign delegations chosen without reference to political sympathies and without tie or commitment of any kind, allowing them to determine their own programme of what they will see and do, and asking only that they take home a true account, however critical, of the country as they found it, is making a first and invaluable contribution to the lowering of barriers. The next should be the throwing open of the country to visitors by the thousand travelling under their own initiative. There are here two immediate impediments. A tourist industry cannot be improvised overnight; it supposes the planning of facilities and the provision of hotels which at present do not exist, the U.S.S.R. since the war having had much else to do. Even more necessary is the institution, as in other countries with a controlled and often unreal rate of exchange, of a special tourist rate. At eleven to the pound the rouble is over-valued approximately fourfold in terms of its current purchasing value, one serious consequence being the impossibility for our university students of Russian of continuing their studies in Russia itself and so equipping themselves to make their due contribution to mutual understanding.

Those from the west who, even so, could go and see for themselves would still be the infinitesimal minority, though their personal testimony would contribute much to leavening the prejudices of the mass. The mass would remain chiefly reliant on information gleaned from the press, and here opportunity lies wide open. It is inherently absurd that the British press should be all but unrepresented in Moscow, one of the world's great capitals and the nerve-centre of one-sixth of the earth's surface. Where there should be 20 correspondents there is to-day one. Were the Kremlin to invite tomorrow the despatch from London of the other 19, carrying as credentials good faith and objectivity and assured in return, within the ordinary norms of national security, of complete freedom of movement and report, the British people would soon discover, or re-discover, a Russian people going peaceably about its business, and the international temperature would drop forthwith.

Another obvious step which the Kremlin can well afford to take is the dropping of its present policy of pinpricks in the diplomatic sphere, where friction has been allowed to generate friction until the end of diplomatic representation is itself endangered. Tension between governments, in the measure that it derives from misunderstanding, it is one function of embassies to help abate. That function no embassy can discharge if it is the victim of petty annoyances designed to isolate it from friendly personal contact with the people of the country. The real sufferers are not the individuals on whom such a policy is visited:

ey are the U.S.S.R. itself and the cause of international peace, for the plomatist so sealed off can have but an imperfect and jaundiced appre-ation of régime and people alike, and it is on his reports that the Gov-nment at home must rely for information concerning both. The oviet refusal to allow the Russian wives of British Embassy officials to join their husbands in this country was an eloquent example of the nprick at its most self-stultifying. Having nothing whatever to gain so acting, the Kremlin played straight into the hands of its detractors oad with this denial of an elementary human right. The world situ-ion is too serious to-day for the wanton forfeiting of esteem by any tion.

By a stroke of the pen, in these and other directions, the Kremlin uld divest the Soviet régime of the cloak of mystery and distrust which present shrouds it to western eyes. The new knowledge might not spel all our misgivings, but it would bring home one basic observation hich could revolutionize the political thinking of many. Over the past ree or four decades the U.S.S.R. has evolved for itself a new type of ciety, which works, and which has come to stay. The westerner, sessing its social achievements in terms of the political price involved, ckons the price too high and instinctively falls to counting on a day hen the Soviet masses will rise against their " masters " and institute a ue democracy of that western type under which alone he can conceive e to be worth living. A visit to the Soviet Union, however brief, ffices to stamp this too as dangerously wishful thinking. The Soviet tizen to-day must be at least 55 years old to have active political emories of another régime, and those memories will go back, not to ything that the west could esteem a preferable alternative, but to the st decadent years of the Czars. To anyone younger the present stem represents as inevitably his way of life as our parliamentary mocracy does ours, and in the light of its achievement in raising his untry, over one brief lifetime, from chaos and defeat to the status of e of the two great world-powers, an ascent accompanied by the most pressive social and material advances within, it is idle to think of per-ading him that he ought to change it for something else. The accept-ce of this truth is, we suggest, a *sine qua non* of realistic thinking in the est, its rejection a deliberate fanning of the flames of incomprehension d ill-will.

Its acceptance is the more important because thereon rests the most ndamental of all the steps that the Soviet Government have it in their wer to take to-day in substantiation of the professed will to peace. So ng as the west clings to its belief in a divine mission to " liberate ", en against their will, all peoples not at present within its political ld, so long will the U.S.S.R. behave like the vicious dog in the fable: *quand on l'attaque il se défend.*" And it will retaliate in kind, by

seeking to "liberate" in its own way those peoples, our own included, that are still wedded to what it considers a decadent, reactionary, capitalistic, *bourgeois* anachronism of a society. It is fruitless to argue here over who began it: pot and kettle are equally black. But equally both must somehow contrive to co-exist, for neither is going to acquiesce in its own eclipse short of war, and war is likely to spell the eclipse of both, and of everything else as well.

The complement to fuller and more objective reporting, given the opportunity, of life in the U.S.S.R. would be the fuller and more objective reporting to the Soviet people of life in the western democracies. Hunger for such knowledge we believe to be widespread, the obstacle to its satisfying the profound distrust in the Kremlin of everything western as being inherently hostile to the Soviet régime. Could we but lay that distrust, and secure such fuller knowledge beyond the curtain as would convince the Soviet people and Government in their turn of the futility of all attempts to overthrow our way of life, then the stage would be set for a new era in international relations. The factor that poisons these relations to-day, as conference after conference proves, is the conviction on each side that the other is its mortal enemy, with whom any accommodation must amount both to a betrayal of principle and to a giving away of positions that may one day be vital to its own defence. From time to time a voice from the Kremlin allows the proposition that both worlds can exist peacefully side by side; yet such is western distrust that it but suspects Moscow the more when it appears *dona ferentem*. The dilemma is clear-cut none the less: either we too must be prepared to believe, and to implement our belief, that both can co-exist in peace, or we abandon hope altogether. It would be a novel effort, but worth the making, to accept the next such Russian gesture as potentially sincere, to address ourselves to the task of convincing the Russians of our own equal sincerity in the same belief, and on a basis thereafter of such minimum respect for the Soviet régime as we would ask from the Kremlin for ours to aim at agreed solutions, in terms not of power-politics but of their individual interests, for those territories and people now in angry debate.

Should this at first proposing seem too much to ask of the western powers, unshakable in the conviction of their moral and political righteousness, let it be remembered that it is asking still more of the U.S.S.R. For in this world of whirring ideologies, that so easily hypnotize us into the belief that we are dealing with ultimate realities while often in fact we but spin a web of words, few pause to consider that Communism, the nightmare of the west, is still to the U.S.S.R. but the misleading name of a party and a far distant goal. There is no Communism in the U.S.S.R. to-day; as the name so clearly states, this instead is a union of socialist soviet republics. Communism implies not the strong centralized State but the withering away of the very fabric of the State to

e fuller realization of the individual. Such a society would by its very sence lie open and defenceless to external attack, and is therefore im- ossible of achievement in any one country or group of countries alone. ence the compulsion that makes of the full Communist creed a world eed, demanding first the replacement of capitalism everywhere by the ll-blooded socialism already achieved in the U.S.S.R. as a stage to the al onward march of all peoples together to the ultimate objective. To mporize with the west means renouncing that objective for the fore- eable future, and is thus for the U.S.S.R. a harder pill to swallow than is for the west to temporize with the U.S.S.R. Our creed depends r its survival not on the ultimate overthrow of another but on our own ntinuing faith in it and on its resilience and adaptability, amid the rains and stresses of the age, as that most conformable to our deepest iritual, political and social needs. It depends also on our ability, intly with the U.S.S.R., to stave off another world war. Should we il in this, he who will may pick up the pieces.

Professor Atkinson, of the Chair of Hispanic Studies at Glasgow University, has recently returned from a visit to the U.S.S.R. as chairman of Scottish Cultural Delegation invited by the U.S.S.R. Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.)

CONTEMPORARY OPINIONS—XVII: Part I.

CAN WAR BE AVOIDED?

BY VISCOUNT AMBERLEY

(In this series of previously published FORTNIGHTLY *articles these have been chosen for a number of reasons: either they review a now famous book, or their reviewer afterwards became famous, or he was already a famous figure speaking his mind about another equally famous, or about one who was later to be so. A further claim to inclusion is made for the treatment of a subject—then of pressing topical interest—which could be applied to, or point the moral of, or throw light on a problem of to-day. Although it is expected that their lessons will be instructive, this is incidental to the object of compiling a diverting anthology even when the writers are at their most serious.)*

To this first volume of 1871 we find also Lady Amberley contributing an article on "The Claims of Women", in which she advocated improvement in the education of girls, that all professions should be open to them, that women should no longer be debarred from separate ownership of property, that a widow should be recognized as the natural guardian of her children, that the franchise should be extended to women, and that pay should be equal for equal work. In their time, of course, the Amberleys were laughed at as cranks or regarded as dangerous, but John Stuart Mill (who incidentally wrote on village communities in the same number) pleaded urgently with John Morley, the editor of THE FORTNIGHTLY, that the enlightened Viscount's scheme for abolishing war through the agency of a league of nations should be published in its pages.

* * * *

EVER since the beginning of the late war between Germany and France a military mood has taken possession of the British people, who are liable to periodical disturbance and agitation about the condition of the national defences. Ministers have been loudly censured for injudicious economy. Alleged weaknesses in our military system have been unsparingly exposed.

All this is in some respects extremely satisfactory. Every one must wish that our army should be large enough for the legitimate purposes of our Empire. Every one must be anxious that the enormous sums devoted every year to the national armaments should be so expended as to secure the utmost efficiency in every branch of the military and naval services. Every one must hope that if any of the too numerous mischief-makers of the world should unhappily entangle us in war, we may not be exposed to so deplorable a breakdown as befell the armies of France under the Imperial system. But there is another side to this question which ought

ot to be forgotten. Newspapers and public men have addressed themelves to the discussion of our national defences without apparently etraying the smallest consciousness that the necessity of maintaining a arge army and a powerful navy is of itself an evil. Instead of trying to ealise Isaiah's vision of peace, we are rather looking forward to the very pposite; a time in which the countryman shall be taken from the ploughhare and the pruning-hook to drill, and when nations shall devote themelves by millions to learning the art of war. There is something proundly mechancholy in such a spectacle. It discourages our hopes of uman progress. It reminds us of the deep-seated distrust which underies the superficial protestations of amity that pass current among ations.

Doubtless the evil is one which at present cannot be avoided. Europe s far too barbarous to admit of disarmament. Men who live in a lawess community may, however peaceably disposed, be obliged to go about ith loaded revolvers constantly in their pockets. But a patriotic statesman would make it his business to take such measures for the protection f the citizens as would render the precaution superfluous. We should hink little of a Government which calmly accepted the loaded revolver s a permanent necessity, and simply advised the citizens on no account o allow it to get out of order. Something of this sort, however, we are bout to do in the case of our army. We possess in it a weapon which at resent, it is true, we cannot dispense with because we are surrounded ith neighbours similarly armed and who cannot be trusted to keep the eace. Measures will be adopted to increase the strength and efficiency f the weapon; none whatever to render the weapon itself needless. Yet urely it can hardly be disputed that this latter task would be infinitely orthier of far-sighted statesmanship, and infinitely more beneficial to he country. Large armaments imply that we live in a semi-savage conition, which all true statesmanship should endeavour to put an end to s speedily as possible. For even if war could be stripped of its incilental enormities, and reduced to a mere combat of armed men, in which very propriety and every rule of military etiquette should be strictly bserved, it would still remain one of the worst of crimes, and would inolve moral evils of the most terrible kind . . .

It is greatly to the credit of the Society of Friends that they, and they lone among Christians, have consistently denounced war as wrong on rinciple. While, however, they deserve all praise for having thus upeld a moral truth which has been so generally over-looked, it must be onfessed that they have altogether failed to propose any substitute of a ractical character for this rude method of venting international spleen. And it is, after all, of little use to assert the criminality of war in the bstract; and of still less use to cry down standing armies and large armaents as if they were its cause instead of its consequence. Nations must earn to trust one another before they can disarm. Yet who can bid us

trust the good intentions of our neighbours after recent experience?

Moreover, it is, after all, a radically false ideal of national conduct which is upheld by the Peace Society. For if we understand them aright, they confine themselves mainly to urging particular nations to keep out of wars engaged in by others. But this course, though often the right one, is not always so. Circumstances might arise in which it would be criminal weakness. To urge peace in this undiscriminating manner, without considering the effect of our conduct upon Europe at large, is to take a road which will never lead us to the end in view. It is probably because the Peace Society fails to recognize any such thing as a just cause for that forcible intervention that it has so little influence even among peace-loving citizens.

Perhaps it might be replied by the advocates of peace at any price that they do not extend their maxim to the case of an aggression upon the territory of any people, but that they admit the lawfulness of purely defensive warfare. This is a position which is seductive at first sight from its apparent simplicity, but which nevertheless it would be hard to uphold on any adequate grounds. If it is not a crime to kill human beings in self-defence, how can it be a crime to kill them in defence of others? It would be a strange morality which asserted that if attacked by brigands, we might lawfully use fire-arms to repel them, but that it would be highly immoral to rush to the assistance of a friend in a like misfortune and turn them to account in effecting his deliverance. Clearly, if we may defend ourselves, we may defend our neighbours, provided they have a good cause, and are unjustly attacked. To assert that in no case could such intervention be justified, would be to place the weaker powers of Europe at the absolute mercy of the stronger . . .

Experience teaches us that peace can only be secured among the members of any nation when they all recognize a common authority which, supported by the united strength of the whole body, is able to enforce its decrees upon any refractory individuals. This common authority must not scruple to use force itself when occasion demands it in order to prevent the use of force by any private person; but the force which the authority can bring to bear against the contumacious must be so overwhelming that the general conduct shall be in obedience to its rules, and that the punishment of disobedience shall be prompt and certain. Only on these conditions can the state of anarchy be avoided. Where there is no common authority we have complete anarchy. Every man must defend his own family and possessions; every man may attack those of his neighbour subject to that neighbour's resistance. This, however, is a state of things which only exists among savages. Where the common authority is not recognized by all, or is too weak to enforce its laws, we have partial anarchy . . .

With the progress of civilization, and the improvement of the mechanism of administration, anarchy becomes less flagrant, until it gradually

lisappears. Private persons learn to respect their neighbours' posses-ions, on condition that theirs shall be respected by others. Blood is no onger avenged (as in rude countries) by the relations of the deceased, ut murder is treated as a crime against the whole community. Quarrels lo not habitually end in a fight. Insults are not punished by an armed ssault on the insulter (though a modified form of this often survives in he midst of legally-governed countries in the shape of the duel). Speak-ng generally, the citizens learn to bring their complaints against one an-ther (where they have any serious ground) before regularly-constituted ribunals, instead of appealing to the strength of their arms or the num-er of their followers. Domestic peace is thus effected by the recog-ition of a common and central authority. The common authority is hat which we habitually term the Government; or in more abstract anguage, the Law.

Might it not then be possible to extend to international relations the ame expedient which has proved so effective in domestic relations? Could not nations agree, as individuals have done, to submit their differ-nces to a common authority? There is at least nothing palpably im-racticable in such a scheme. In the European Congress which fre-uently assembles after a war to settle the terms of the treaty of peace, ve seem to have the germ of a common authority. How much misery would be avoided if such a congress could meet *before* a war instead of fter it, and make peace without the bloodshed which now precedes it. But a diplomatic assemblage like this, though useful, is still in many espects unfit to discharge the functions of the supreme international uthority . . .

In the first place, it is evident that all the countries which desire to be epresented in it must enter into a voluntary alliance. On no nation hould this alliance be forced against its will, though powerful induce-nents might be held out to the unwilling to join it. The allies would nutually engage—(1) To abstain from all warlike attacks against any ne of the allies; (2) in case of dissensions arising, to bring their dissen-ions before the central authority; (3) to aid (in a manner to be here-fter explained) in repelling aggression upon any of the allies, either by ny other ally, or by an unallied power, if called upon to do so by the entral authority. This treaty—which might, if necessary, include any ther articles— should be ratified by the Government and people of each State in the most solemn manner known to their local customs.

The next question which presents itself to us is that of the composition f the central authority. Calling the nations which may enter into the upposed alliance the Federation, we will call this authority the Federal Council. It will be obvious at once, then, that the Council must con-ain representatives from every member of the Federation. As to their umber, and the mode of their election, we may remark, first that the epresentatives of each power should not be very few in number, but

sufficient to ensure variety of view, and to avoid the appearance of a close or limited assembly—such as a diplomatic Congress—which seldom inspires great confidence. Six representatives would probably not be too many, and there might be more without injury. Secondly, the number sent by each country should be the same, and should not depend upon its size. In a Council representing, not population, but those aggregates of population called nations, there is no reason why the feebler aggregates should not enjoy equal weight with the stronger, for they require guarantees against injustice as much as any. Acting on a similar view, the American Constitution provides that the Senate, which represents States, shall contain an equal number of Senators from each State, whether large or small. Thirdly, as to the manner of election, it will probably be best that each country should proceed upon the system it prefers; the essential point being that the members sent to the Federal Council should possess the full confidence of their countrymen.

At the same time, there is one condition which is of capital importance, and which the people of each country should insist upon, namely, that the members of the Council should be completely independent of the executive Government of their nation; that they should hold no office under it; and be in no manner responsible to it, or subject to its dictation. Were this condition neglected, the Council might become the scene of mere diplomatic intrigue, which it could scarcely do if its members were perfectly unconnected with the ruling powers . . .

The legislative functions of the Federal Council would probably be of a subordinate and secondary character. National independence would require that it should in no case meddle with the internal affairs of any country. But the conduct of nations towards each other would come within the scope of its operations. On difficult questions of international law, its decision might be accepted as final, authority being given to it not merely to declare what the former practice has been, but to enjoin new practices, if needful. It would be empowered to hear complaints from strangers travelling or residing in a country against its Government; for instance, of any insult or injury inflicted on them by the custom-house or police, and to devise arrangements by which such evils should be avoided.

Incomparably the most important, however, will be its judicial duties. In this sphere it will be required, if dispute should arise between any two or more members of the Federation, to hear their arguments, and decide the case upon its merits. Should the complainant have just ground of offence, they will order the nation which has given it to make a suitable apology, and material compensation if need be. Suppose, however, that one of the Federal powers, notwithstanding the obligations incurred by the treaty of alliance, should unjustly attack another, what should be the conduct of the rest of the Federation? Such an aggression is a crime against the whole of the Federation, a crime equal in magnitude and cor-

esponding in character to that of high treason against an individual State. Morally speaking, it is an offence of a graver kind; legally speaking, it is an offence fully as grave, for the majesty of the whole Federation is assailed in the person of any one of its members. No small difficulty, however, is raised by the question how to deal with such treason. To seize and execute a nation is impossible. We have to consider hen, in what other mode it can be punished for its violation of public aw. Now it is plain that there are ways, short of war, in which the entiment of disapproval can make itself felt against a nation. The first nd most obvious is, the suspension of diplomatic relations. No ambassador should be sent to or received from the offending power, unless for special communication. But stronger measures than this might be aken. Ships belonging to the assailant might be detained in neutral orts; while her merchant-vessels might be rendered liable to seizure on he high seas. All neutral markets and ports might be closed against er, so that she would be unable to draw from them any kind of supplies, while the enemy would draw them freely. Nay more, her coasts might e blockaded by neutral vessels, if it were thought that in this way her ction could be more effectually crippled . . .

Moreover, if a whole people cannot be brought before the bar of the ouncil as prisoners, its rulers, at least, can; and rulers who knew that hey were liable to take their trial as criminals for an unnecessary war ould be likely to feel some hesitation before entering into it. The Council therefore should be empowered to summon to its tribunal any monarch accused of declaring or provoking war, along with his advisers t the time of the declaration. It should try them for high treason, and ave authority to condemn them to any penalty, not excepting the extreme penalty of death itself. Of course this could only be done with he co-operation of the nation governed by this sovereign and his ministers. Refusal to surrender them for trial would render any proceedings gainst them ineffectual. Where, however, a monarch had made war ithout the consent of his people, they might be expected to surrender im; where they approved of his action and protected his person, they ould make themselves participators of his crime, and he, as the mere gent of their will, would not be peculiarly guilty, and would deserve no eculiar condemnation . . .

Nevertheless it must be acknowledged that all this might be unavailng. National vanity or national antipathy might be so strong as to force n a war in spite of neutral condemnation; or the enemy might be so nferior in strength as to render any action of neutrals, short of active arfare, a matter of little moment. We are thus brought face to face ith a further question of extreme delicacy, and which can hardly be nswered without some hesitation. Is the Federation ever, under any ossible circumstances, to declare war itself? Or must it confine itself

exclusively to the milder forms of interposition suggested above?

At first sight it would seem rather inconsistent that a Federation, established for the express purpose of preventing war, should ever assume the attitude of a belligerent. To do so would look like a flagrant violation of its own laws; and would, moreover, wear the aspect of a palpable failure in the whole scheme for the preservation of peace. But it is plain that we are on the horns of a dilemma. If an aggressive and warlike nation should refuse to listen to the admonitions of the Federal Council, if it should be strong enough to disregard the active, though unarmed, opposition of all the rest of the Federation, then a partial war has taken place, and the purpose of the Federation has failed. If, on the other hand, the Federation itself engages in the contest, then a general war has taken place, and the purpose of the Federation has failed . . .

Unquestionably it is the duty of a government to repress all disorder, all violence, all fighting, within the limits of its jurisdiction. Its object in so doing is to save the life and limbs of all. Can it accomplish this task without the occasional employment of violence itself? Clearly not. If riots should occur in any locality, a government may properly send armed policemen to quell them, and these policemen cannot be blamed if they deal some hard blows to the rioters; while in extreme cases even the military may be employed, and the public safety may imperiously require resort to so destructive a measure as that of firing on the crowd, whereby men may be killed without trial, and possibly without being guilty. But this is not all. Habitual lawlessness on the part of individuals, or bands of persons, must sometimes be met by lawless measures of repression. . Bands of robbers infesting a district, whom it is impossible to capture and bring before a regular tribunal, may be pursued and shot by the agents of government, if that is the most effectual manner of putting them down. Rebels in arms, if their number should be formidable enough to cause danger to loyal people, may properly be opposed by troops, and on their refusal to surrender, be treated as enemies, and subjected to a hostile fire. Nobody would defend such rigorous proceedings as desirable, if they can possibly be avoided; but where the general tranquillity cannot otherwise be secured, it would be the extreme of constitutional pedantry to condemn their use. Nor is the character of government as a peace-preserver held to be at all prejudiced by this necessary violence. On the contrary, it would be unable to preserve the peace if violence were in all circumstances forbidden to it.

May, 1871.

The second and concluding part of this article will appear in the next number of The Fortnightly.

WELFARE FOR THE AGED

By Alfred H. Haynes

WHEN the first Pensions Act was passed in 1908, an arbitrary line was drawn fixing 70 years of lifetime as the beginning of old age; in 1925, with the introduction of a scheme providing for pensions on a contributory basis, the age of 65 years was accepted as a new basis. Under the National Insurance scheme which now operates, 65 years continue to mark the beginning of old age for men and 60 years for women. Within a matter of 40 years, therefore, the legislature has made three attempts to measure old age by a defined span of lifetime; on each occasion, a different conclusion has been reached.

Fortunately, however, in terms of health, strength, capacities and outlook, the process of living is not regulated by the statute book. There are some, of course, who grow old before their time; in the vast majority, however, old age is a relative term which merely signifies the passing of the years. The fact that there are now 7,000,000 people in the over-pensionable age group does not mean to say that all of them present social difficulties; apart from financial assistance, it is probably true to say that 85 per cent. of their number are quite capable of regulating their own lives and of fostering their own welfare.

For the remaining 15 per cent. totalling approximately 1,000,000 persons, however, old age means an increasing dependence on others. At the present time, there are 58,000 aged persons occupying chronic sick hospital beds, with a further 10,000 on the waiting lists; the numbers requiring care and attention and now accommodated in the old folks' hotels provided by the local authorities and the voluntary agencies total 31,000. To these two groups in residential establishments, there must be added the large numbers of aged who are either occupying mental hospital beds or who are accommodated in private nursing homes. The social problem of the aged within the community thus reduces itself to a hard core of approximately 750,000 persons most of whom are living on their own. In the knowledge that medical advances and social science are continuing to add years to the expectation of life, this number is likely to increase.

When, in 1944, an inquiry was carried out by the Nuffield Foundation into the problems of ageing and the care of old people, it was ascertained that the primary needs of the aged are for financial security, companionship and adequate care in times of sickness. As a direct result of the

inquiry, the National Corporation for the Care of Old People came into being and this body, together with the National Old People's Welfare Committee, continues to exercise an important influence in the direction of welfare effort on behalf of the aged. The fact that there are more than a thousand welfare committees operating at local level and that voluntary effort has established 550 old folks' hotels with accommodation for 18,000 residents is sufficiently indicative of the extent to which the two national organizations have influenced contemporary thought.

With the advent of social insurance and national assistance, financial security in old age is now largely a matter of ensuring that insurance rates and assistance scales keep pace with the cost of living. Whether or not the current allowances are adequate, the fact remains that, as a social evil, poverty has been brought under stricter control. In regard to the other equally important needs of the aged within the community, however, the official Welfare State has limited its assistance to the provision of home nursing and domestic help services and to the grant of financial assistance in the establishment by voluntary effort of club and meals facilities. It cannot be denied, of course, that immeasurable benefits have accrued to old people as a result of the inception of the national health service, but such benefits have not been especially designed for old people alone. In the sphere of personal welfare, neither the National Assistance Board nor the local authorities have been given powers to establish welfare services, and it is at this point that the major social problem emerges.

The point which needs clearly to be kept in mind is that old people differ from other community groups because they are *old;* in relation to the hard core already mentioned, welfare does not so much consist of doing something for them as it does of taking an interest in them. Whether or not the abolition of the law of filial liability has assisted in the creation of the all too-prevalent noncommittal attitude of sons and daughters towards the needs of their aged parents, the fact cannot be denied that, within recent years, there has been a marked decline both in family unity and of a sense of moral responsibilities. Many there are, of course, to whom such an assertion does not apply; nevertheless, that so many old people are now being left to " paddle their own canoes " is a significant reflection on contemporary filial attitudes.

In a healthy society, moral obligations do not need to be enforced by law; the pendulum has now swung, however, from the poor law code, with its insistence on the legal obligations of children to assist their parents, to the parentalism of the Welfare State. The parallel which exists between the present situation and that of 1834, when Chadwick's Commission felt bound to recommend a reversal of the Speenhamland decision, needs to be kept in mind. " For the general diffusion of right

inciples and habits, we are to look not so much to any economic rangements and regulations, as to the influence of a moral and religious ucation"; so reported the 1834 Poor Law Commission, and there can no doubt that, in very many cases, the social problems attaching to old e could quite easily be solved by a revival within adult sons and ughters of the moral and religious basic truth contained within the osaic precept to "honour thy father and mother."

This is not to say that the attitude of the minority gives to the Welfare ate an excuse to embark on a policy of retrenchment; in some direc- ns, administrative reorganizations might well be carried out with bene- ial results, but, in relation to old people, there is need for the Welfare ate to do more, and not less. During the past six years, there has been uch emphasis on the provision of old folks' homes and the need for e creation of additional chronic sick hospital beds; with 97 per cent. the aged population continuing to reside within the community, how- er, the need for the establishment of a welfare service which can assist l people within the social setting of their homes has become apparent. art from the home nursing and domestic help services already men- ned, there is no other statutory welfare provision for assisting them.

The worries and problems associated with old age are varied, numer- s and often incapable of definition. For a very great number, living ne spells boredom, acute apathy, depression and sometimes suicide; ny cases have occurred where old people have died for the want of dical attention. Unsuitable living accommodation, coupled with in- nity and failing faculties, often translates life into a daily struggle ainst the material world. For some, deafness, failing sight and hritis are curtains which exclude participation in, and enjoyment of, mer activities and interests. Added to such problems and difficulties a host of others ranging from the difficulty of mounting stairs to an bility to understand forms and documents. In the 1944 Report of Assistance Board, mention is made of the fact that "many problems ive from the fact that old people are apt to find the pace and com- cations of life in a mass mechanized society too much for them"; hin this statement is contained an important clue as to why the social blems associated with old age are more evident to-day than they were years ago.

Instead of being medical in nature, the primary problems associated h old age are social, and it is to the welfare services that the old people hin the community must look if they are to obtain a satisfaction and ive a purpose from their added years of life. When, on July 5, 1948, Welfare State came into being, it was hoped that the National Assist- ce Act would be in the nature of an "Old People's Charter"; the ission of the word "aged" from the provision which enables local horities to establish welfare arrangements for blind, deaf and dumb,

and crippled persons, has, however, negatived this hope. Unless substantially and permanently handicapped by illness, injury or congenital deformity, old people have no claim to the statutory provisions which provide for recreational and instructional facilities, information and advisory services, holidays, visiting, etc. For the intimate officer-client relationship which existed under the former poor law, there has now been established an impersonal relationship whereby assistance grants are paid over post-office counters; only at infrequent intervals are old people visited in their homes by officers of statutory departments.

In the absence of the legislature providing for the needs of the aged, the burden of providing personal welfare services thus falls on voluntary effort. The degree to which this has been organized varies in each locality and, although there are still some 400 local authority areas (mainly rural in character) in which old people's welfare committees have not yet been established, the fact that there are now more than a thousand committees in being is both enheartening and significant. Of a lesser, but nevertheless important, significance is the fact that old people's welfare committees are fully representative of the different voluntary organizations, religious groups and statutory bodies which exist at local level. Through the media of these representatives, besides being able to call on the services of a large pool of voluntary workers, the committees are enabled both to view the needs of their area as a whole and to ensure that particular social needs, as revealed by the different organizations, are kept under constant review.

Among the more important services which the old people's welfare committees have brought into being are clubs, chiropody, mobile physiotherapy, meals-on-wheels, and information centres. Important and much appreciated though these group services are, it is, however, only by visiting old people within their own homes that voluntary workers can establish personal contacts. Of the many hundreds of inquiries received from old people as a result of a " Silver Lining " broadcast, less than a quarter came from those with defined needs; most of the inquirers were genuinely lonely old people whose greatest desire was for a regular visitor with whom they could have a friendly chat. At a recent conference of the National Association for Mental Health, it was stated that loneliness and social isolation are direct threats to mental health; in each successive annual report of both the National Corporation and the National Old People's Welfare Committee, an ever increasing emphasis has been laid on the necessity for local committees to seek out and to keep in regular touch not only with the partially and totally house-bound but with old people generally.

The concept of welfare for the aged is thus gradually swinging from an emphasis on " old folks' homes " to an emphasis on " the old folks at home." That there is a continued need for communal homes goes with-

saying; as a result of the knowledge and experience gained during past six years, however, the two national voluntary bodies have ex-ssed their intention of concentrating their energies on assisting the elopment of new or modified schemes to help the aged who continue eside within the community. In the welfare pattern of the immedi-future, therefore, local authorities will provide old folks' hotels under r statutory powers, leaving it to voluntary effort to supplement their iciliary home nursing and domestic help services. To encourage further development of old people's clubs, the King George VI ndation has allocated a sum of £200,000 to the national voluntary eties, and a further sum of £50,000 for the purpose of establishing experimental non-residential clubs in selected areas.

Much useful information concerning the associated problems of old has been obtained both from social surveys and from the factual orts submitted by local committees. At the present time, an im-tant survey, likely to extend over a period of five years, is being con-ted in the borough of Andover (population 15,000); complementary his survey, which will seek to inquire into the needs of old people erally, a detailed investigation is being made by the National Old ple's Welfare Committee into the social circumstanes of a group of ndred elderly people who are living alone or in couples. In relation he economic and financial problems involved in providing for old age, overnment committee was established in July 1953. Other investiga-s, both at national, regional and local levels, are proceeding.

From the data and evidence thus far received, not only have a number itherto unsuspected needs been revealed, but new ways of helping people have been discovered. In Plymouth, for instance, a new ntary pioneer effort is undertaking the boarding-out of selected rly people suffering from infirmity; in Ilford a night attendant ser-has been so successfully established that the Minister of Health has nised to give sympathetic consideration to any similar schemes that be prepared by the local health authorities. Much useful work has ng from the housing society movement, approximately 130 old ple's societies having now been registered; in addition to building ses and converting others into flats for the special needs of aged per-, such societies are responsible for the administration of sixty hostels residential clubs. Commencing with Southport, Exeter and ffield, the movement to provide education in ageing is spreading to er parts of the country, and lectures on such subjects as "Occupation" "Physical Problems on Growing Old" have proved to be of interest help both to elderly people and to those who are providing for their fare. In co-operation with the county librarian, the Nottingham People's Welfare Committee has arranged special talks and intro-ed new interests for old people at county libraries. In other parts of country, mobile laundry schemes have been introduced, rest and

holiday homes provided, and useful links forged with the hospital geriatric services.

Behind all the welfare work which voluntary effort seeks to do, there lies the prime motive of making it possible for old people to continue to live independent lives. "We feel", said Mr. John Moss, C.B.E.,* chairman of the National Old People's Welfare Committee speaking at a recent conference, "that we must concentrate on helping old people to live comfortably in their own homes for, even if their home is only a single room, that is their proper place." The significance of this statement is that, far from merely reflecting the views of an independent tribunal, it puts into words the wishes and inclinations of old people themselves; indeed, in the reluctance of old people to be separated from familiar surroundings and in their almost fanatical determination to preserve and retain their independence are to be found two of the most powerful reasons for championing their cause. Born in an age when community welfare was almost unknown and brought up in the Victorian school which taught the qualities of self-respect and self-dependence, the aged section of present day society is the force which serves to leaven the attitudes of those who regard the Welfare State as a benevolent and charitable institution.

In view of the fact that there is an inter-relationship between the financial problems of old age and the general economic situation, the question of extending working life beyond the age of 65 years has recently been the subject of much discussion and thought. During the financial year 1954-55, the National Insurance fund, out of which retirement pensions are paid, will begin to show an excess of expenditure over income by 1979, the deficit is likely to reach the gargantuan figure of £450,000,000. There is, therefore, a clear danger, now becoming increasingly apparent, that, unless the elderly can themselves contribute to the national volume of wealth by continuing in employment beyond the present accepted retirement age, the burden of providing for them through the media of national insurance and national assistance will become so heavy that, not merely their own, but the general standard of living will be endangered. The incentives provided by national insurance for the payment of increased benefits in return for the postponement of retirement age are of little value unless employers are prepared to make suitable employment available; in the general welfare provision for the aged, therefore, there is scope and opportunity for industry, commerce and the professions to play an increasingly important part.

Whatever form it may take, welfare on behalf of the elderly consists of taking an interest in them; in the post-war years, much has been achieved but there is still more that could and ought to be done. In

* "The Employment of Older Men and Women" by Mr. Moss was published in the January 1954 issue of THE FORTNIGHTLY—*Editor.*

self, old age is not a social problem; associated with it, however, are umerous physical, mental and social difficulties which can only be lved or ameliorated by the development of a deeper sense of com-unity responsibility. " Old people must be helped to be independent . . but with dignity and not condescension; they must be visited . . . ut as friends and colleagues and not as though having a favour bestowed on them; they must be instilled with confidence in themselves . . . nd in their friends." So reads an extract from that same report of the ational Corporation for the Care of Old People which ends: " Friendly dvice, sympathy and practical help can so be given as to avoid any elings either of regimentation or patronage; it is to be hoped that, ventually, there will be established a complete service for old people hich will assist them, not as problem cases, but as members of our tional family. Let me grow lovely, growing old—so many fine things ."

The author is a District Officer in the National Health Service. He is ice-Chairman of the Institute of Welfare Officers, and a member of the xecutive Council of the National Association of Local Government ealth and Welfare Officers, of whose Kent branch he is a Past President.)

THE INWARD EYE

By Norman Nicholson

WHEN Wordsworth wrote his lines about the daffodils and the " inward eye which is the bliss of solitude " he was describing what is for me the greatest pleasure of sound radio. For I am a solitary listener, listening almost always in bed and in the dark. As with many others to whom travel is a rarely possible adventure the radio is my chief means of transport. Television and the cinema do not appeal to the visual sense in the same way. They place before you a solid, particularized scene; you may take it or leave it, but always you are outside, a mere spectator. Sound radio, on the other hand, constructs the scene in your own head. You are part of the landscape and the landscape is part of you. The audience of a radio play is not in the auditorium but on the stage. The actors speak close to your ear; the door creaks only a yard behind you. Offstage there are not just wings and backcloths and dressing-rooms; there is a broad outer landscape, the imaginative hinterland of the play. You are allowed to look not just into the room but out of the window.

Not all broadcast plays, of course, have this power of appealing to the inward eye. It is missing in Congreve and present in Goldsmith; missing in Wilde, present in Henry Arthur Jones; missing in Somerset Maugham, present in Eugene O'Neill. It is missing in much that is most brilliant in our drama and present, often, in the casual, even clumsy, thriller. Among the boyish blood-and-thunder of *P.C. 49* one is sometimes lifted, for a moment or two, into a vivid mental experience of a midnight street, with the shadows in the doorways, the late bus, the slow, significant footsteps. Characters, dialogue and situations are as crude as a strip-cartoon, but the scene has the subtlety, the fascination of a Cruikshank drawing. Odd words, odd phrases, the tone of a voice, the chime of a clock, the hoot of a steamer—such things stir up the memory until a strange landscape is evoked, real as yesterday, personal as a dream.

It is when this mental landscape takes its proper part in the imaginative scheme of the play that radio achieves some of its finest effects. This is especially true of the Russians—Chekov, Turgenev, Gogol, indisputable masters of the air. In the recent Third Programme production of *Ivanov*, one was continually aware of the garden outside the house, of the decaying farms, the sad, winter trees, the moonlight over low, repetitive hills. When John Gielgud, as Ivanov, set out at the end of the act to go to a neighbour's, one sensed the acres of loneliness through which he would have to pass, the icy landscape of despair out of which he could not break. The inward eye created not just the setting

of the play but also that greater landscape which is the element in which the characters live as fish live in the sea.

It so happens that recently we have had a new work which exploited to the full this visual power of radio. Dylan Thomas's *Under Milk Wood* was notable for many things. It was notable, for instance, for its virtuosity in the use of verbal sound:

> Sly and silent, he foxes into his chemist's den and there, in a hiss and prussic circle of cauldrons and phials brimful with pox and the Black Death, cooks up a fricassee of deadly nightshade, nicotine, hot frog, cyanide and bat-spit for his needling stalactite hag and bednag of a pokerbacked nutcracker wife.

It was notable, too, for its easy and brilliant use of pure radio technique, as spontaneous as *Itma*, which it often resembled. There were the split-second caricatures, the sudden, unexpected voices, the innuendos ("O nobody's swept my chimbley since my husband went his ways"), the groaning puns and tomboy jokes, over before you had time to protest:

> *Mr. Ogmore*: I must blow my nose.
> *Mrs. Ogmore-Pritchard*: In the garden, if you please.
> *Mr. Ogmore*: In a piece of tissue-paper which I afterwards burn.

But above all it was notable for the enchanting picture it evoked in the inward eye, not so much by direct description, as by the use of phrases which touch off the imagination like a lighted match:

> It is tonight in Donkey Street, trotting silent, with seaweed on its hooves, along the cockled cobbles.

And by the arrangement of the town and out-town round a few named and easily recognizable features:

> It is night moving in the streets, the processional salt slow musical wind in Coronation Street and Cockle Row, it is the grass growing on Llaregyb Hill, dewfall, starfall, the sleep of birds in Milk Wood.

That this work demonstrates Dylan Thomas as a dramatist of potential greatness seems very doubtful. Its inspiration is almost exclusively adolescent, both in its delicacy and its coarseness, both in its innocence and its bawdiness. Its conventions of character and behaviour are drawn from the stories of such Welsh and near-Welsh writers as T. F. Powys, Rhys Davies and Caradoc Evans. And if Thomas is kindlier than they are towards the frailty and hypocrisy of men, and still more of women, his kindness is often next door to the sentimental. *Under Milk Wood* does not belong to, or even aspire to, the order of the best of his poems, though the imagination from which it springs is essentially the same. Yet for all this, it is perhaps the most captivating, the most triumphantly enjoyable work of pure entertainment that the radio has yet given us. Let us hope that we shall have more chances to hear it, on the Home as well as the Third, and even (why not?) on the Light.

(This is the first of a series of six articles by Mr. Nicholson on radio listening. The second will be published in the August number of THE FORTNIGHTLY.)

WHY DO WE MOURN?

I

Why do we mourn, we followers of Christ,
Who walk behind Him—ah, so far behind?
That gap must be the answer: would we bind
Our sorrows to our hearts if we could find
That His love's promises in truth sufficed?

II

We should be joyful always; but we mourn
When one endeared to us is taken back
Into God's arms, and, stretched upon the rack,
We show the passing world how much we lack
Of peaceful yielding to the new-found bourn.

III

We are but human, and our grief is real:
We cannot in our hearts evade its force
Or wish to stay its headlong, heart-sick course;
It comes to us from God; we know its source,
The pure outpouring of our love's appeal.

IV

The more we loved—and love—the deeper Death
Must pierce our hearts in rifled Life's disdain:
If wealth of love was ours, there must be pain;
And Jesus wept where Lazarus was lain,
Man's grief redeeming by His human breath.

V

It is no sin to suffer: that is given
As balanced bondage holding hearts in thrall:
Earth's solitude and silence, like a wall,
Resistlessly enfold, encrusting all,
Flesh reaching out to spirit, Earth to Heaven.

VI

The task of Life endured is still to hear

The singing of the Comforter, the voice
Within, beyond us, bidding us rejoice;
To lift our loneliness in freedom's choice;
To know, past grief, our love—and God—are near.

VII

Therein is greatness of resolve and deed:
No bitterness, rebellion, or despair,
But beauty of remembrance and the stair
To heights where we, undaunted, dream and dare,
The wind-washed mountain-ranges of the freed.

VIII

This is the challenge of God's risen Son
To Death's dark claim, the victory
Christ came to win, the gift of liberty
To creep or climb, a dirge or harmony:
So is the reconciliation won.

GORELL

AFRICA LIES WITHIN US

Africa lies within us, not without;
untamed within the surging of the tides
which beat unceasing on the human heart,
like moonlit ripples on the muddy sides
of some forsaken creek. It remains always
with us; a landscape pulsing in our veins,
fierce with the burning pity of our days,
tense with the meaningless urges and the pains
of living and of dying; a naked landscape;
a landscape of beginnings and of ends,
from which the traveller never can escape,
where he forever seeks and never finds,
where he at last grows weary of all care,
and makes the final journey to despair.

RAYMOND TONG

U. OF L
LIBRARY

SOME COMICALITIES OF THOUGHT

By Joshua C. Gregory

THE "great Architect", Raphael explains to Adam, by keeping th inner nature of the heavens secret from man, may have his laugh over their quaint conjectures and disputes. Men themselves ca have their laugh when age, though it did not wither Cleopatra, make many opinions quaint and comical. Some sins are openly punished now to promote belief in "divine providence",but some sins are not pun ished at present to leave something for the "last judgment" to do: thi notion of St. Augustine has a comic flavour.

For Aristotle the stars are ethereal, intelligent, and divine. They ar also spheres, and globular divinities are incongruous enough now to b comic. Incongruity, however, does not complete the ludicrous, sinc mental tension must also drop; seriousness and the comic are enemies A splendour in Aristotle's notion, however quaint its science, and respec for the great Greek may stifle the comic. Familiarity with Aristotle' notions may also dull the comic sense. Bodine incurs the comic by hi globular angels and his ascription to departed souls of an absolute round ness like the sun or moon. This comic touch derives from an indurate ancient notion: the perfection of the sphere.

When Robert Burton writes as Democritus Junior in *The Anatomy o Melancholy*, 1621, he gives two recorded estimates of his eponym: little "wearish" melancholy old man, and a hearty laughter at huma follies. No glint of amusement is perceptible in Burton's discussion o Bodine and his globular angels, whether it was there without appearin or not there at all. The general theme may be still too serious in th seventeenth century, when the New Testament extorts a belief in cor poreal angels from Hobbes. "Courteous revelations" from globula angels now seem odd and comic. Sir Thomas Browne, who believes in th revelations, does not affirm the sphericity of their courteous authors, bu the comic spirit relishes the conjunction. The moon, many philosopher thought must be well polished. It is, Galileo declared, neither polishe nor perfectly round; like the earth itself, it is rough, hollowed, an jagged.

Peirce reports a bit of scandalous gossip from the medieval Scotu Erigena: Socrates died of chagrin after Helleborus had beaten him i argument. Peirce reproves Scotus for his idea of truth embodied in s random a story. Some amusing beliefs of the past are not so random According to the Platonists, as St. Augustine records, the devils o

spirits live in the air, have airy bodies, and, being passionate, love poetical figments. Plato's proscription of the poets, however, could not deprive the gods of any delights because these beings have no human desires, and therefore do not love poetry. The gods who do not like poetry are no randomly conceived beings, but consequences of a thought-way which drops out comicalities for modern minds. If humour is the comic plus sympathy, Sallustius of the fourth century excites it. His gods are always good—there he has our sympathy; they are very numerous—there he has our smile.

Serious beliefs which secure respect if not belief often have their comic side. One has when all things are said by St. Thomas Aquinas to tend to be like God. Aquinas might have his answer to a finger pointed at the boa constrictor, for the mother serpent is a cause of baby boa constrictors, and is like God by causing. When the *Summa Theologica* discusses the effects of love St. Thomas stirs our smile in the passage on its relation to ecstasy. Lovers, he remarks, do not *always* lose their reason, rhetorically implying that they usually do.

To the young Descartes at college nothing seemed too strange for some philosopher to believe. Descartes himself, Pascal thinks, would have been willing to dispense with God, but required him to set the world going with a fillip. Pascal may or may not have been too earnest to take the comic touch from a world flicked into motion by the divine finger. Seventeenth-century beliefs, however, keep no monopoly of the comic when Alexander's god breaks it. His god, as Dean Inge notes, " only gives notice that he intends to emerge." The gods of philosophers tend to be strange beings. A. N. Whitehead's god has been compared to a propositional function—not, perhaps, quite accurately, but not inaptly.

The comic, as such, is logically neutral: the item may be funny because, or partly because, it is true, or, partly at least, because it is false, or independently of its truth or falsehood. Inge's comment is comic mainly because it does describe the quaint nature of Alexander's God. Science has its comicalities as well as theology. According to one form of a vogue in seventeenth-century explanation, rubbed amber shoots out a sticky emanation which sticks to a near straw, and carries this back with it to the " electric ". A clasping effluvium, clutching a straw back as an elephant filches a bun from a palm with its trunk, is comic because the notion is superseded. The comic need not be contemptuous even when an error, or presumed error, is ludicrous. It may be humour through sympathy, as the inexperience of a child is sympathetically amusing, for experience will cure its naïve errors. In the seventeenth century Gilbert had again clearly distinguished electrical from magnetic attraction, and made one decisive step towards modern physics.

The modern reader smiles when the writer drops Achilles and the tortoise into his text, or takes Zeno's Paradoxes as his theme. The smile welcomes an old friend, but it also has a comic relish—Achilles

and the tortoise has been, and still is, so *very* often discussed. Repetition can amuse first and then irritate, as it did when R. L. Stevenson's "one penny plain and twopence coloured" became vogue. At first, when the phrase kept popping out, it was expected with pleasure and greeted with amusement; then, when custom had staled it, it was expected with dread, and greeted with nausea. Such repetitiveness suggests that the parrot is at it again, but there is no animus in the smile at Achilles and the tortoise, for perpetual respect is due to one of the most remarkable items in the history of thought. According to Zeno, Achilles only seems to catch the tortoise because logically he cannot. Logic also keeps the arrow at rest however swiftly it may seem to fly. Zeno launched his famous paradoxes, including these two, in the fifth century B.C.; they are still running in the twentieth century A.D., and running vigorously.

The constant recurrence of the paradoxes, with a regularity suggesting, though not precisely imitating, the periodicity of the tides, often incurs a second comic element. One attempt to confute Zeno's logical confutation of actual motion applies, diagrammatically, the relativistic world-line to explain how Achilles can catch the tortoise logically as well as actually. This desperate use of modern concepts to circumvent the baffling Zeno adds an extra comic touch to the comicality of regularly repeated refutations. The shade of Zeno, though perhaps a bit puzzled, might smile cheerfully at another attempt to use modern intellectual artillery against him. In this Achilles is expositorily reduced to a "particle", and then quantum theory spreads him, during his run, into "something like a cloud", into a state of "diffusion". The selfhood of an electron has been said to be merged into a shared electronhood, and correlated with a power to act. So Achilles, expositorily reduced to a "particle", tries to evade Zeno's logic by sharing his selfhood in particle-hood, and thus being able to run. The variety of the confutations, variegated according to the notions employed, is as comical, or almost as comical, as their steady recurrence.

The comicality is always respectful to the power of paradoxes that, after nearly two and a half millennia, still stir sages to resolve them, and it may respectfully conclude that so much applied sagacity must have succeeded. Each sage, however, seems to be too dissatisfied with other sages for the comic relish quite to lose its bite on incessantly repeated failures. It is at least tempting to parody Dr. Johnson. If the number of attempts to prove that poverty is not an evil is the best proof that it is, then the best proof that Zeno's logic is invulnerable is the number of attempts to prove that it is not.

The tortoise is uncouth, ungainly, and slow, yet, amusingly enough, has an honoured place in legend. Zeno destined him to one honour when he made the slow tortoise an effective foil to the swift-footed Achilles in the baffling paradox. The tortoise figures in a famous puzzle;

he also figures in a famous race. The hare was swift, and the tortoise was slow, but the tortoise got there first. Since he did not win because he was slow, but because he kept at it, he has both helped to puzzle the sages and, by his own example, urged them to keep going. He may yet have another connection with the matter. Hermes made a shell of a tortoise into a lyre; it would be appropriate to sound the paean on this if Zeno the discomfiter is ever finally discomfited.

Epimenides, like Zeno, is traditionally connected with paradox. Antiquity scattered many puzzles into the tradition to plague, or stimulate, logicians. At one end of a bridge over a river stood a gallows and a courthouse which housed four judges. Anyone intending to cross by the bridge had first to state on oath where he was going and what he intended to do. If he spoke truly the judges let him cross, but he was hanged on the gallows if he lied. One wayfarer, put on his oath, swore that he was going to die on the gallows. The perplexed judges submitted the problem to Sancho Panza, the Lord Governor of the Island. He saw their trouble: the traveller must be hanged if he swore falsely, and could only swear truly by being hanged. Let the man pass freely, Sancho finally decided, for it is better to do good than ill. The Governor humanely decided, as some might say, to hang logic and save the man.

"The Cretans are always liars, evil beasts, slow bellies": so Epimenides is said to have said. He was also said to have been a Cretan himself. If he chooses to include himself among evil beasts, logicians let him rest in his choice. When he included himself among the persistent Cretan liars he presents logic with a prey in a paradox: if whenever a Cretan speaks he lies, Epimenides is lying about Cretan lying, and if he therefore speaks truly he again includes himself among the liars who always lie. Epimenides seems to have been a bit of a zany since he could easily have avoided the paradox by excluding himself explicitly from the great mass of Cretan liars. Some logicians, apparently, would advise Epimenides to say: "All Cretans, except myself, invariably lie, are evil beasts, and are slow bellies." Various escapes from the logical predicament of "the liar" have been commended, as from Zeno's paradoxes. According to one, if "all Cretans are liars", as the reputed statement is often rendered, and Epimenides tells the truth, then by definition, he is no Cretan. This dubious logic seems to save him from one lie by telling another, for he is always taken to be a Cretan, and to tell an alternative lie is morally worse than being a zany.

Further logical zest contemplates the statement, "I am lying now", or "The statement on this board is false" chalked on a black-board. The logician busy with such inane statements suggests a bee trying for honey in an artificial flower. Zest also tempts the hunt for paradoxes into imaginary instances. Aristotle is brought into one in which he is legitimately supposed to know his own father. He is shown a masked man, who actually is his father, and does not know him. This version

of *The Larvatus Paradox* can be strengthened by tying the parent up in a sack instead of merely masking him. Then Aristotle both knows his father and does not. Knowing his father, recognizing him, is to know him under appropriate conditions, and the paradox is artificially manufactured by a camouflage. In the amplified paradox Aristotle knows the name of his father, the man in the sack is his father, so that Aristotle knows, or should know, the name of the concealed man, and does not. This is solemnly called an instance of " the fallacy " in which " the name of X " is regarded as a " matrix ". Knowing his father does not, in any reasonable sense, include recognizing him without peering into the sack or peeping under the mask.

As modern logic wends its onward way it sometimes incurs the comic without necessarily prejudicing its insight. The King of the Cannibal Islands is the square root of two. This seems plainly false, but many modern logicians would say " no ": the statement is not true, for the mathematical expression cannot describe a human being, but neither is it false because a nonsensical statement cannot be either false or true. Now intelligible nonsense usually conjoins incompatibles. Micky Mouse, for example, does what no mouse can do, and in Lear's nonsense verse the Owl and the Pussy-Cat are impossible navigators. Such nonsense amuses, but, according to such logicians Lear's statements are neither true nor false. Though logicians may justly contrive a many-valued logic, it seems comical for " caterpillars are great admirers of Aristotle " not to be false because it cannot possibly be true.

Etymology has its comicalities. " Caelebs ", a bachelor, has been defined as a man on his way to heaven. This is early etymology, and may be optimistic, though " on his way " is not " arrived ". There seems to be no complementary definition of a Benedick. This might be a man who is in heaven or, alternatively, will not be long there. The distinction between verbal sign and meaning has helped both sophistry and playfulness to prey on a confusion. Seneca describes one instance to Lucilius: " mouse " is a syllable; a mouse eats cheese; therefore a syllable eats cheese.

Human language is the cry of the beast complicated and corrupted by arrogant anthropoids: Anatole France relishes a wholesale anathema. Language, however, is now a favourite target. Many years ago a grammarian would often congratulate writers on their magnificient instrument in English; to-day writers constantly deplore its defects. Two opposite propositions, said Robertson of Brighton, constitute truth. Amusingly enough, language is now doubly and oppositely accused of being both too precise and not precise enough. Ordinary language, Lascelles Abercrombie recognizes, is too rigid for the poet, and not rigid enough for the philosopher. Language will never be precise, A. N. Whitehead once complains, until metaphysical knowledge is complete. The philosopher, as Abercrombie sympathetically notes, wants strict logical mean-

ings, but cannot get them. The poet, inversely, wants all the meanings he can get from ordinary language, and many others. Logicians, however, undeterred by A. N. Whitehead's warning, strive to construct a rigidly precise language. Amusingly again, according to Abercrombie, poets also try " to construct a higher language ", though they aim at the " super-language " of " poetic diction ".

Philosophers and logicians, intent on precision, relentlessly hunt down ambiguities. Even the sternest logician may smile at the ambiguously worded testimonial: " The Headmaster who gets Mr. X to work for him will indeed be fortunate " as he continues to hunt his quarry. Poetry takes a hint from comic ambiguity to enrich its diction with ambiguities, for the poet who hankers after many meanings naturally loves a statement effective in many ways at once. The comic contrast between philosophy, or science, and poetry, or literature, need not point to folly. The logical, seeking clarity, rationally restricts meaning; poetry or literature may legitimately pack meanings to secure expressiveness. The philosopher trying to tie his language tightly to one meaning, and Empson, commending the *Seven Types of Ambiguity*, are, or may be, complementary, not contradictory. There is comicality, however, when language is accused both of too much and too little preciseness, or ambiguity is harried by logic, and cherished by poetry.

Poetry and literature often humanize by personification, and Chinese painting has been condemned for depicting a world without any suggestion of laughter or tears or pleasure or even boredom. This critic wants a humanized world from the painter's brush. The physicist wants a dehumanized world from science when he insists on purging physics relentlessly free from anthropomorphism. Science, in fact, surrendered anthropomorphism reluctantly. The particles of oil were supposed by many to gratify their mutual affection, or family feeling, most effectively by packing themselves into little globes. Physical things had been presumed for centuries to have their inanimate analogues of social responses when the mechanically minded seventeenth century frowned upon such partial humanization of purely material objects. There is something amusing now in family affections among particles of oil, even in their reduced physical form, and something amusing again when the natural philosophers of the seventeenth century sternly reprove this.

Physics has been bitter against " forces " because they were too anthropomorphic and too intolerable a humanization to be acceptable to science. It is, therefore, amusing to notice how freely physics still sprinkles " force " into its language. It is, of course, a method of expression, as the personificatory use of " nature " is, since " force " has been too indispensable a word to be expelled from physics by the many, and in the past often virulent, attacks on its alleged anthropomorphic lineage. Forces were often supposed, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to be efficacious immaterial entities. The muscular

sensations when arms roll a barrel up a slope, or stop it from rolling back, are, so many arguments have run, anthropomorphically introduced as "force" between wholly physical objects when, for example, the cue sends a billiard ball on. Such accusations of anthropomorphism have been repeated often enough in the history of physics to raise a smile when they recur. This constantly reprobated anthropomorphism does not prevent physics from selecting a unit of force by choosing the attraction between an electron and a proton.

In the seventeenth century Sir Thomas Browne uses a decision against the hereditary transmission of acquired characters to soothe qualms and remove errors about Adam's lost rib. Adam's male posterity, Browne explains, need not have one rib less than a woman even if one of his ribs was used to frame Eve. Fathers do not transmit their mutilations to their sons, and, as a crippled father may have a son who is not crippled, the sons of Adam need not have only eleven ribs because he had lost one of his twelve. The "common conceit" that a man has one rib less than a woman is fallaciously inferred from Genesis. Neither fact nor inference can decide whether Eve was made out of a left or a right rib or out of one from each side. An Adam created originally with thirteen ribs superfluously defends the Creation story. Each man and each woman has, normally, twelve right and twelve left ribs: this is anatomical fact. Adam did not involve his sons in the loss of a rib: this is reasonable inference from observation.

Sir Thomas mixes theology into an anticipation of modern discussions over the hereditary transmission of acquired characters. St. Augustine, theologically and partially, anticipates a modern notion. The angels help the miserable, but have no compassion for them; they act like compassionate men, but do not feel as helpful men feel. When St. Augustine respects the angels too much to credit them with the passions or emotions or feelings of men he unwittingly anticipates modern behaviourism, though partially. This discusses men and not angels, but it resolves an angry man, for instance, into what he does—with his fists, for example, or with his feet. In 1926 however the arch-behaviourist Watson goes far beyond St. Augustine. The saint leaves the angels their reason, and men have reason too, though they are also perturbed by anger or other passions. The arch-behaviourist, on his own confession, offends the philosopher by denying mind, the psychologist by denying consciousness, and the psychoanalyst by denying the subconscious. St. Augustine respects the angels enough to regard them as rational, though dispassionately so; the behaviourist, in effect, sweeps man clear of all pretensions to be a rational being. A non-conscious being seems to be as queer a man as an emergent process is a queer God, and the past has no monopoly of strange beliefs.

Thought constantly throws out comicalities. After many mice had romped in a cage every mouse but one had lost its whiskers. The still

whiskered mouse had eaten the whiskers off his fellows, and encouraged the biologist to apply a theory. This is easily done to-day: the semi-cannabilistic mouse had obviously, by some freakish mutation or genetic chance, acquired a whisker-eating gene.

Atomic physics has its comicalities as well as biology. The bond, the uniting agency in cohesion or chemical affinity or the like, has always challenged interpretation, been variously explained and constantly continues to present a problem. The nucleons of atomic nuclei, the protons and neutrons of modern exposition, present the bonding problem because they are, or seem to be, so firmly bound. Two boys, who keep themselves together by tossing a ball from one to the other for catches, present an amusing analogue of consorting nucleons. On one serious version the nucleons do pelt one another with mesons, as two snowballing boys might keep close together to aim surely. The mesons, detached from one nucleon and absorbed by the other, are very evanescent. The comic may riot too much if it compares the absorbed meson to a snowball melting down the neck of a victim, for nucleons are not boys, as mesons are not snowballs, but the meson exchange has been compared by erudite physicists to a game of ball.

New ideas can breed new fancies. Some ancient beliefs, it would seem, are too fantastic to be revised back as behaviourism has revised St. Augustine. Some beliefs of the early Platonists, or Neoplatonists, recorded of Apuleius by St. Augustine for example, may be too strange in our eyes to be revived or revised. The air is peopled with spirits, according to Apuleius, who are created, rational, and emotional like men, eternal like the gods, and made of air. An eternal rational spirit, who lives in the air like a bird, and is made of the air he inhabits, seems to us to be fantastically conceived. Many centuries have passed since Augustine; when as many more have passed many of our beliefs may seem as strange in retrospect as the aerial spirits do to us. St. Augustine took them seriously enough to test Apuleius by Christian principles. Some serious discussions of some present beliefs may seem to future historians to resemble St. Augustine's serious discussions of notions that have become historical curios. The philosophical fuss over the behaviourist's non-conscious man is at least suggestive.

Clio seems to assent, smile, and wave Thalia forward: there is so often a comic recompense for final truth unfound. There need be no acrimony in the genial comic even when it sports among our own ideas, and the comic in itself is no logical arbiter, though the ludicrous can be, and often is, a powerful ally in logical attack. When beliefs of the past are still candidates for acceptance, though being superseded, the comic can be used to give thrust to argument. The comic spirit need only be genial, without acrimony, when it notes the ludicrous in ideas already disenfranchised by the great destroyer of men's imperfect notions—time.

THE UNION OF ITALY

By Margaret Carlyle

All students of the Italian Risorgimento owe a debt of gratitude to Mr. Mack Smith* for the vivid picture of the various political groups and of their leaders which emerges from his detailed study of the internal political conflict in Italy during 1860. This debt is shared by students of Italian political life at the present time who can only hope to understand the aims of the modern political parties and the problems which face all Italian politicians if they have some knowledge of the questions which divided Italians in 1860 and which left a permanent mark on Italian politics.

It might be feared that the minute, often day to day, examination of the handling of the situation by various politicians would make it difficult to see the wood for the trees, and that the presentation of so much material would make the book unreadable. On the contrary, the main questions at issue are clearly presented, as for example in the account of Mordini's hesitations and doubts before he finally issued his decree of October 5 summoning a Sicilian assembly, and the feeling of tension is so vividly conveyed throughout the book that the reader's interest never flags.

The fundamental question at issue, as the title of the book conveys, was the resolving of the conflict between Cavour and Garibaldi, and unfortunately the author's bias makes the whole book unfair to the man whom Mr. Mack Smith himself describes in his introduction as one who "has his place secure among the greatest statesmen and greatest liberals of any nation." It is difficult to reconcile this estimate of Cavour with Mr. Mack Smith's account of his policy and action during 1860. The general impression left by the book is that Cavour had no understanding of the passionate desire for Italian independence and unity which inspired Garibaldi and many lesser men of all parties, that his sole aim, as his opponents said at the time, was the aggrandizement of Piedmont, and that even in pursuit of this end he followed no definite line of policy, though he was ready to seize such opportunities as were given him by the astonishing successes of Garibaldi in spite of the fact that he deplored them.

Mr. Mack Smith presents Cavour as a vacillating politician waiting for events to make up his mind for him; he constantly uses such phrases as: "Up to the begining of July Cavour had rather drifted before events" and: "At last [in October] he knew his own mind." Even when Cavour decided that his policy of waiting had been justified and that the right moment had come for the Piedmontese army to invade the Papal States, Mr. Mack Smith writes: "No doubt it had suddenly struck Cavour that, since Garibaldi might in any case cross the Papal frontier soon and spread the conflagration into central Italy, he himself could gain nothing and might lose much from standing idle."

This picture of a hesitating Piedmontese politician, moved largely by fear of Garibaldi and his 'revolutionary' plans, bears little resemblance to the European statesman whose policy had perforce to be adapted, outwardly at least, to the European situation, and who knew that a united Italy could only be created if he advanced step by step in the assurance of British good will and of French acquiescence, at least, although, as he wrote to Ricasoli on June 27, 1860: "I have no doubt of the final result." This was the background of his negotiations with Naples which aroused such bitter suspicions among

* *Cavour and Garibaldi 1860*, by D. Mack Smith. Cambridge University Press. 45s.

the Garibaldini. On July 8 Cavour wrote to Ricasoli about these negotiations that he could not reject out of hand an offer of agreement made under the auspices of France. In the case of war Piedmont could not stand alone; even supported by England, Piedmont could not fight on the Alps and the Mincio at the same time. Here and there, in an almost casual aside, Mr. Mack Smith refers to the difficulties created by the attitude of the European powers; but a proper appreciation of Cavour's policy requires a full exposition of the general situation, and is essential for an understanding of Cavour's hesitations in regard to the Sicilian venture.

Mr. Mack Smith's refusal to accept Cavour's political statements or writings at their face value leads him astray in his detailed account of the discussions on plebiscite *versus* assembly in Sicily. Many Sicilians and other South Italians disliked the rigidly centralized form of Piedmontese administration and only their expectation that some form of local autonomy would be granted to the southern regions made them willing to accept 'annexation'. Mr. Mack Smith twice records the fact that as early as June Cavour had told Farini, at that time Piedmontese Minister for Internal Affairs, to work out an official statement on local government, recommending the devolution of power on the historic regions of Italy. He also quotes Cavour's letter of October 19 to the Sicilian General Carini, in which Cavour wrote: "Sicily can count on my ministry to promote a system of wide administrative decentralization. The government will put before parliament its project to introduce this system of regions, and then it will be for parliament to push it through." Mr. Mack Smith assumes that these promises of Cavour were mere matters of strategy: "in the end they [the June plans] came to nothing, and he [Cavour] did not show much regret over the fact." This is an unpardonable assumption. Cavour believed strongly in the merits of administrative decentralization; his letter of January 15, 1861, to Montezemolo, quoted by Mr. Mack Smith on page 416, says: "Our political ideas do not allow that a capital city should tyrannize over the provinces; nor will we tolerate a bureaucracy that subdues every part of the realm to an artificial centre, and against which both our national traditions and our geographic conformation would be in conflict." It was Cavour's premature death in 1861 which prevented his policy from being put into effect.

It is conceivable that Cavour was a less great man than Italian and English historians have believed and that the new material now available may establish this. But if so, the case against him must be supported by the full weight of the evidence. Attack by innuendo and by the refusal to believe what Cavour wrote to friends and supporters cannot belittle the great man whose untimely death was in no small measure responsible for the unsatisfactory aspects of Italy's political development.

BOLIVIA, by Harold Osborne. *Royal Institute of International Affairs.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

ECUADOR, by Lilo Linke. *Royal Institute of International Affairs.* 13*s.* 6*d.*

PARAGUAY, by George Pendle. *Royal Institute of International Affairs.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

Before, during, and immediately after, the 1914-1918 war the late Mr. T. Fisher Unwin published some 14 volumes under the general title of "The South American Series". Of these and others, *The Times* commented: "The output of books on Latin America in recent years has been very large, a proof doubtless of the increasing interest that is felt in the subject." This was written in an era when Latin America provided a good deal of the unearned income of many people in this country. But those dividends ceased to flow so regularly in the late '20's and '30's, and—can it have been coincidence?—so did the flow

of books about Latin America from British publishers. To-day Latin America is of vastly increased importance to every man, woman and child in this country; for the 20 republics are now not so much a source of interest income for the few as markets for exports, of which the production and sale, there and elsewhere, is ultimately vital to Britain. If in the past there was reason for investors to take an interest in the source of their dividends there is now every reason why many more should seek information about Spanish and Portuguese America.

Rightly recognizing the need for this information the Royal Institute of International Affairs has, in the last three years, produced a series of books on certain of the Latin American republics, of which these three volumes are the latest to appear. This series, it is said, is "designed to give a concise but comprehensive picture of the political, social and economic conditions in those countries for the benefit of the non-specialist reader and student." It is, therefore, unfortunate that, given the enterprise shown in the conception of this series, the expense obviously involved in producing it, and the labour which the authors have clearly put into their work, the results should be disappointing.

It is clear, from the volumes so far published, that a fairly tight rein has been kept on the authors. This is unfortunate for them, as comparison with their other writings will show. Whether it is unfortunate for the public depends on what kind of reader the veiled editor of the series really has in mind. The student? He will learn something. The non-specialist reader, perhaps the foreman of a firm building locomotives for Latin America who is interested in learning something of the country which ordered them? He has less hope; as a specialist reader this reviewer has found these books rather heavy meat. The business-man setting out to sell tractors and anxious to get a rapid picture of his market? He would get a picture of some sort, certainly, but one in black and white, cold and without any light and shade. Those responsible for this series appears to have had no very clear idea of their target and so have been unable to tell their authors how to set their sights.

Of the present three volumes that on Paraguay is the most satisfactory. George Pendle, recognizing the truth of the statement that the history of Latin America is reflected in the lives of its rulers, has given us sketches of Dr. Francia, Marshal Solano Lopez and General Morinigo, all of whom have left their mark on Paraguay. And in contrast with his previous volume in this series, on Uruguay, Mr. Pendle has firmly confined his statistics to an appendix.

Lilo Linke and Harold Osborne, however, have given little space to the outstanding personalities in the history of Ecuador and Bolivia. Flores and Garcia Moreno each dominated Ecuador for 15 years, but we get no clear idea of what kind of men they were. As for Bolivia, Mr. Osborne fails to make either Santa Cruz or Melgrejo come alive. This may be because he holds, according to his preface, that Bolivia's internal history "is likely to hold little interest for the general reader." The same could be observed, and more truly, of the table giving the latitude, altitude and mean annual temperature and rainfall of the chief towns of Bolivia, and of the graph on page 5 depicting the seasonal variations in rainfall in departmental capitals for 1945. Mr. Osborne, like Miss Linke, has allowed statistics to stray too widely into his text. Both Miss Linke and Mr. Pendle give welcome attention to education and the arts; but Mr. Osborne says: "Owing to limitation of space educational and cultural aspects have been touched on only incidentally."

It may be suggested that limitations of space in this series are largely due to the inclusion of too many statistics. Some are necessary but many duplicate those available elsewhere. All will, in any case, quickly become out-of-date, and if any of these volumes reaches a second edition the labour and expense

of revision will be considerable. But if there are too many statistics there is not enough understanding of Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay reflected in these pages; indeed Miss Linke's opening sentences in her chapter on the constitutions of Ecuador come close to making fun of her subject. All three authors are familiar with the countries of which they write; but only Mr. Pendle has managed to convey something of Paraguay more than bare facts and figures—an idea of "what makes it tick."

N. P. MACDONALD

THE WAR AT SEA, Vol. I, by Captain S. W. Roskill, R.N. *H.M. Stationery Office.* 42*s.*

This volume takes us up to December 31, 1941, and deals realistically and impartially with our uphill struggle during that period. In the great financial strain following the 1914-1918 war the navy had been "cut to the bone" and its revival was hampered by the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and the Anglo - German Naval Agreement. While we rigidly adhered to the terms of these agreements the Germans, subsequently to 1925, entirely ignored them; thus their new ships largely exceeded the limits of displacement imposed on ours.

Once again our main fleet had no fortified base as the previous war's defences of Scapa Flow were almost non-existent in 1939, and our fleet had to dodge the U boats from one undefended anchorage to another until the Flow had been rendered reasonably secure. We had lost the use of the Irish ports, Queenstown, Berehaven, Lough Swilly, so vital for the protection of our ocean convoys in the western approaches, and in the early stages the navy was desperately short of trained air support. However we had an excellent naval staff and the Chief of Staffs Committee became a splendid team for combined operations, so these matters were effectually dealt with. Our personnel had never been better and though the fleet was largely composed of ships dating from the previous war they were in a high state of efficiency.

This volume covers a period of immense difficulties successfully tackled, though often at heavy cost; the evacuations from Norway, Dunkirk, Greece, and Crete, the battles of the Atlantic and of the narrow seas, and the sinking of the Bismarck. The fall of our ally France involved some heart-breaking situations; this and the entry of Italy into the war with her powerful fleet lost us command of the Mediterranean. Our army and its supplies had to be transported round the Cape to Egypt and it seemed hardly possible that we could retain even a foothold in that sea. However the inefficiency of the Italian fleet and the heroism of Malta saved the situation.

Towards the end of 1941 when things were beginning to look up the year closed with a new era of trouble. The entry of Japan into the war, the loss of the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse* at Kuantan, the fall of Hong Kong and the disaster of Pearl Harbour.

Not only has Captain Roskill had the benefit of Sir Winston Churchill's work, which is frequently referred to, but he has also had the advantage of access to the captured German archives. From his experience during the war and afterwards as Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence he was well qualified to undertake this task. The story is well told and the interest never flags. The detailed account of these great naval events is supplemented by 17 appendices. There is a copious supply of maps and plans and the book is well illustrated.

ROBERT N. BAX

MAKING MEN, by W. McG. Eagar. *University of London Press.* 20*s.*

This important book tells the story of boys' clubs. Mr. Eagar is primarily concerned with them as a particular method of handling boys but he considers any other sort of movement which influenced their development. The re-

sult is a wealth of information about their lives, their needs, and how those needs were gradually met. Ragged schools, institutes of innumerable sorts, settlements, temperance groups, Scouts, Boys' Brigade, they are all here, with full documentary evidence. Moreover, as drains, transport, trade unions, housing, and many other themes can be used to prise open the last 100 years, so the author has used adolescence.

First came the recognition and statement of a definite problem. James Greenwood did this in *The Seven Curses of London* in 1869, though many people had stumbled on it before. He showed that large numbers of London's working boys were ruined during their adolescence because "outward circumstances press and hamper unfairly," at their most susceptible age. Then the problem was tackled with greater understanding. Some as individuals, some in groups sponsored by colleges, churches, public schools, some avowedly secular, all experimenting, moved towards a conviction that work with adolescents required methods of its own. On the whole, though with notable exceptions, such as Manchester, they found that the best answer was one or two men working with a limit of 50 boys, winning their confidence, and providing a varied programme with the club open every evening. After this colourful, uncoordinated period came co-ordination, with federations in the big cities, Liverpool, Manchester, and Salford, Bristol, Newcastle, Birmingham, and London leading the way; the National Association of Boys' Clubs in 1925, and finally State participation and the Service of Youth.

The pioneers of boys' clubs are giants in Mr. Eagar's story. Astonishing men, often finding themselves, as they worked "in a spirit of respect for, and civility towards those it is intended to benefit." They killed the 'keep them off the streets' myth, for they were not the social dustmen of industrial society; they were out to build character. And the record shows that boys' clubs have helped considerably to achieve the provision of playing fields, the ending of widespread dead-end employment of adolescents (until National Service upset things), and the raising of the school leaving age, while deepening our knowledge of all social affairs.

Unfortunately this is not an easy book to read. The writing is rather heavy and deliberate. The reader tends to lose his bearings in a welter of facts about the early stories of settlements, missions and clubs. Unfortunately too the author does not go much beyond 1930, because he fears that the story would be out of perspective. But it is a pity that with his experience and knowledge Mr. Eagar did not give his reflections on present day youth work, and how it affects boys' clubs. For all that, it is a book which the general reader who perseveres will enjoy, and which every teacher, club leader, and administrator of education should read. Fundamentally boys' clubs are educational, and for all who are concerned with education Mr. Eagar's *Making Men* contains some useful reminders.

NORMAN EVANS

THE SECRET PEOPLE, by E. W. Martin. *Phoenix House.* 21*s.*

Mr. E. W. Martin's study of English village life in the past two hundred years is a work of considerable importance, not only to the sociologist but to the man who takes a general interest in the history of our countryside. The approach is difficult for the author has what might perhaps be called a schoolmaster's attitude. His pages, full of fact and pertinent suggestion, are in the early chapters at least, cold, dry and unattractive. But the patience of the reader is rewarded as the author warms to his subject, and those who can conquer the first 50 pages will be conquered by the rest and realize very faintly what England owes to the villages, and how badly the debt was dishonoured.

We have to remember that only 130 years ago reaping machines were unknown, their introduction was opposed and many village folk, deprived of their holdings and rights of common, were

reduced to serfdom and poverty. Squire, parson and farmer exercised a tyranny that seems almost fantastic. Children, uneducated and ill-nourished, were taken for field and factory; education was opposed by what may be called local authority for fear that the supply of cheap labour might suffer. It is well to remember that the first Factory Act (1802) was needed to decide that pauper children under the age of nine should not be bound to factory work and that employers should not work them for more than 12 hours a day.

In the reign of George II, 226 Bills of Enclosure enabled landlords to seize more than 300,000 acres of land, to the ruin of many small husbandmen and cottage holders who lived with some approach to comfort, or at least sufficiency, by hard labour on very few acres, sometimes less than half a dozen. They were sacrificed deliberately, and from 1750 down to the beginning of the 1914-1918 war it may be said with confidence that the villagers never had a chance that squire, farmer and parson could not take away. There was no deliberate intention to do wrong: these dominent men merely followed an inherited tradition of oppression.

Mr. Martin's survey, very completely documented and dispassionate, should restrain those who hold that the agricultural worker is getting more than his fair share to-day. The grandfathers of the men who live in some small low-rented cottage and may have a family income of £20 a week, went hungry, and were rewarded for long years of toil with the workhouse and separation from their wives when strength failed. This hideous condition was witnessed by those of us whose memory goes back even to the end of the nineteenth century. Truth to tell, the villagers suffered from cruel oppression through the great part of those years of which Mr. Martin, using lens and scalpel, writes with sound judgment, recalling the pregnant utterances of past students of the country scene, Joseph Arch, the Rev. Baring Gould, William Cobbett, Charles Kingsley, Jethro Tull and Arthur Young. Here is a worthwhile book; it should find a place on the shelves of all who study the story of English rural life.

S. L. BENSUSAN

A VILLAGE IN ANATOLIA, by Mahmut Makal. *Vallentine Mitchell.* 18*s.*

DALMATIA, by Eric Whelpton. *Robert Hale.* 18*s.*

THE LITTLE TOUR, by Giles Playfair and C. FitzGibbon. *Cassell.* 21*s.*

It is probable that Mr. Whelpton and the two authors of the third book will agree with me that of the three here under review the book by Mahmut Makal is the most important. When a country turns away from the age-long traditional methods these will be harder to eradicate in the villages than in the more or less cosmopolitan towns. And the experiences of the village schoolmaster are of absorbing interest, particularly as Turkey is such a valued member of the eastern Mediterranean alliance to-day. A bridegroom may still be dragged from the nuptual bed to be exorcised, against impotency, by the village religious leaders; but if they are all as understanding as the Mulla Mastafa of whom we are told then all is well for the future of this country of warriors and sturdy peasants.

Before Yugoslavia received her present name there was, among various proposals, the suggestion that Napoleon's Illyria should have that honour, and certainly the eastern shore of the Adriatic is perhaps the most beautiful part of the whole country. Mr. Whelpton knows it well; he tells us for instance how the sailors of Ragusa, as Dubrovnik used to be called, even helped to supply the beleaguered British Garrison during the three years of the siege of Gibraltar. He met a retired sailor whose vocabulary was culled in about equal proportions from the New York dockside and Shakespeare, but I am sorry that in his account of Hoste's naval victory off the island of Vis in 1811 against the French he does not mention that gallant young midshipman who, temporarily in hos-

pital, ran down to the harbour and swam to his ship; he was wounded by a shot in his leg on the way to that vessel, but reached it safely and is not one of those who lie in the lovely British cemetery.

When Mr. Playfair and his friend Mr. FitzGibbon arranged to write a book about Europe's miniature States he himself was to become responsible for San Marino and Liechtenstein, while his friend would undertake Andorra and Monaco. Mr. FitzGibbon's task was much the harder, for there is little to be said about Monaco that the world does not already know, while the dour smugglers of Andorra have no very picturesque story in their records. There have been changes since the Middle Ages, but the two co-Princes are still the Bishop of Urgel and the head of the French Government, the former receiving 12 capons, a dozen hams and a similar quantity of large cheeses each Christmas, while the tribute to the French amounts to about £100 a year. Mr. Playfair had some years earlier been in Liechtenstein with his father, the famous actor, and we are told of a delightful—if that is the right word—adventure, when after walking for a long time in the night near the Luxembourg frontier Sir Nigel lay down happily until they discovered that they were on a railway track, after which they chose a ditch, full of stinging nettles and old tin cans. The sensitive reader is likely to feel himself stung by the everlasting repetition of the word 'collaborator', when Mr. Playfair refers to Mr. FitzGibbon, while their companion who is responsible for the satisfactory illustrations is invariably called 'lady photographer'. "You'll have another beer, won't you?" said the 'collaborator' to someone in Liechtenstein; and of small beer in this book there is no lack. On the other hand the interview with the laughing Dr. Hoop, President of the Bank, a judge of the High Court, a lawyer with a private practice and the former Premier, is very enjoyable.

San Marino has in the past had its vicissitudes, as when Cardinal Alberoni invaded the little Republic in the eighteenth century, thinking that the friendly elements would give him a warm welcome, while he brought a hangman along to deal with the others. It has never been an easy matter for an Italian to acquire naturalization, 40 years being necessary for that object. Mr. Playfair found a guide who would still have ten years to wait. He does not mention the eight Italian policemen who serve because it would be embarrassing if Sanmarinese relatives had to arrest one another. He also—although he continues to embarrass us with his endless "collaborator and lady photographer"—appears not to know why the stonemason Marinus fled so long ago from Rimini; and how it was that his termagent of a wife, who followed him to his mountain refuge, departed when she found that he slept on an uneven slab of rock which she would have to share.

HENRY BAERLEIN

THE SHAKESPEAREAN MOMENT: Its Place in the Poetry of the 17th Century, by Patrick Cruttwell. *Chatto & Windus.* 18*s.*

The least satisfactory feature of this scholarly and challenging book is its title. Even if a certain period in Shakespeare's artistic development can be claimed as its climax, it is not entitled to such a monopoly as the use of "moment" implies. Nor would we gather that Donne occupies almost as important a place in Mr. Cruttwell's study as Shakespeare.

In Mr. Cruttwell's view to think of the Elizabethan age as a solid, unchanging unity is utterly misleading. Within it were two generations and, roughly corresponding to those generations, two mentalities. The 1590's were the crucial period between them. Of the poetry of that decade Mr. Cruttwell chooses Shakespeare's sonnets as specially representative. Though not published as a whole till 1609 Meres's reference to them among his private friends in 1598, and the inclusion of the 138th and 144th in *The Passionate Pilgrim* in 1599, connect them sufficiently with the 1590's for

Mr. Cruttwell's purposes. He is somewhat too contemptuous of the "cranks" who seek to identify the young nobleman, the rival poet and the dark lady. But he believes they have an autobiographical basis, and have in view a higher social section than could be reached in the theatre. The first sonnets "show the simple sensibility of the early Renaissance." As the sequence proceeds there is increasing complexity. The sonnets become much more introspective: "the interest is often far more in the writer's general state of mind than in the object of his love or even the love itself." The dark lady sonnets carry us still further from Spenser to Donne. Thus Mr. Cruttwell shows that the 130th beginning: "My mistress' eyes are nothing like the sun," satirizes in exact details one of Thomas Watson's. This further takes the form of unqualified railing, which overflows into drama in *Hamlet, Lear* and *Timon*. And the complexity of the later sonnets is reflected in such problem plays as *Measure for Measure* and *Troilus and Cressida*. "The sonnets are a sort of embryo, in which the essential evolution of the whole of Shakespeare is carried out in miniature."

In the 76th sonnet he speaks of "new-found methods" and "compounds strange". Here in the poetic world outside the theatre he had been anticipated by John Donne in his *Satires* and many of his *Elegies* and *Songs and Sonnets*. And the core of Mr. Cruttwell's work is the emphasis on the common quality between Donne and Shakespeare, both, in spite of many differences, "to their finger-tips dramatic." He explains and illustrates this as, for instance, in the comparison of the "she" of Donne's love poetry with Shakespeare's Cleopatra. This affinity, marked

RECENT PUBLICATIONS FROM THE GOVERNMENT BOOKSHOP

FIRE AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

By D. I. Lawson

A general scientific account of the starting of fires by an atomic explosion with details of the effect of heat radiation on a wide variety of materials.

2s. 6d. (2s. 8d. by post)

MARKETS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Report of the United Kingdom Trade Mission to Iraq, Kuwait, the Lebanon, Syria and Saudi Arabia during November and December, 1953.

5s. (5s. 3d. by post)

LONDON AIRPORT

Details of the siting, function and general layout of the three buildings of the Central Terminal Area which are now in course of construction, and form the latest extension to the Airport. Illustrated. 2s. 6d. (2s. 9d. by post)

COLONIAL TERRITORIES

Events and developments in the affairs of the British Colonial and Protected Territories during the period April 1953 to March 1954. (Cmd. 9169).

6s. (6s. 3d. by post)

HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

York House, Kingsway, London W.C.2; 423 Oxford Street, London W.1; (Post Orders: P.O. Box 569, London S.E.1); 13A Castle Street, Edinburgh 2; 39 King Street, Manchester 2; 2 Edmund Street, Birmingham 3; 1 St. Andrew's Crescent, Cardiff; Tower Lane, Bristol 1; 80 Chichester Street, Belfast; or through any bookseller.

by a kindred metaphysical linguistic style, developed through what Mr. Cruttwell calls "the Shakespearean moment," the first decade of the seventeenth century, till it reached its climax in Donne's *Anniversaries* (1611-22) and Shakespeare's last group of plays (1609-12). "Both have an effect as of bringing together all the strands of a crowded and passionate experience and weaving them into a new pattern. They both combine a furious realism with a symbolism more remote than their authors had made use of before." How Donne achieved bliss in thinking about a girl of 14 years whom he had never seen is convincingly set forth. Perhaps less so to some will seem Mr. Cruttwell's handling of the last Shakespearean group—*The Winter's Tale, Cymbeline* and *The Tempest*. He holds that we are wrong in thinking that Shakespeare knew they were to be his last plays. They should be considered not as an end but as a new beginning, an experiment. They are not less dramatic but less theatrical than their predecessors. And this leads up to a comparison between them and Donne's *Second Anniversaries*.

Within the limits of this review one cannot follow Mr. Cruttwell further in his discussion of the dividing influences which broke up the brief glorious unity of the Shakespearean moment. Puritanism, rationalism, classicism, all contributed and the Civil War overthrew the hierarchical society for which Shakespeare wrote. Mr. Cruttwell even questions, if a man with his genius arose to-day, whether he could parallel his achievement.

F. S. Boas

SHELLEY'S IDOLS OF THE CAVE, by Peter Butter. *Edinburgh University Press.* 15*s*.

Aside from his briefer lyrics and more earthy dramas, Shelley remains, of all major Romantic poets, the most difficult to interpret. His rival might have been Coleridge who plunged far more deeply into abstruse philosophies and world systems, but that he turned, for the discussion of them, away from poetry to the treatise and the lecture-room. Whole tracts of his intellect and argument never came near his poems at all. Shelley, on the contrary, is inclined to be far simpler in a prose essay than in any of his more sustained productions in verse. From the *Address to the Irish People* to the *Defence of Poetry* he thrashes out his arguments earnestly and without overmuch metaphor or ornament. When it comes to the poems, the intention is often equally persuasive, and this is topped by all the overtones of poetic imagination, of images based on nature's beauties or man's theories. To the unpractised reader there is little enough to indicate when a passage is built up on the strictest symbolism and when it is a mere frisk or gambol of the creative fancy.

Those who dismiss his cloudborn, skiey structures as a torrent of verbiage will probably not stay to be converted by Mr. Peter Butter's whispered commentary and tiptoeing exploration of Shelley's most typical countries of the mind. There are landscapes almost as indelible and personal as those of *Kubla Khan*, wherein ravines and caverns, gushing streams and mountains symbolize mind and universe, man's thought in its relation to eternity, with such emblems as the lamp, the lyre or the ever-favourite boat to indicate the soul. Selecting and re-grouping these images under some of Shelley's characteristic themes, Mr. Butter often reaches beyond previous analysts (he claims no innovations for this manner of approach) in deducing mental states from material pictures. A study of this kind proves again how hard it is for the normal mind to see like Shelley in whom imagination is so much more real than the natural world.

Yet Mr. Butter is perhaps the first to notice his remarkably close approximation to a creative present-day mind—one that goes even further in his own direction: Dr. (now Dame) Edith Sitwell "surpasses him in verbal brilliance, in originality of word and phrase, and rivals him in the exquisite rhythmical flow of her verse." Mr. Butter finds a

similar series of elemental symbols—the fertility of the sun, the cold that shrivels up life, the evil power of gold—by which "they conduct us to the highest places of their thought." The comparison illuminates both poets, and one would like to see Mr. Butter develop it.

Still, Shelley is not all enigma. There is a danger in this type of study that the simplicities may be denied and caught up into the general veil of mystery. Mr. Butter does allow a boat to be a boat at times; and for his purpose he does not pick *The Cenci, Oedipus Tyrannus* or the lighter love lyrics. He is tackling the more esoteric poet of *Alastor* and *Laon and Cythna,* of the *Prometheus,* the *Triumph of Life, Epipsychidion;* and in these he suggests many a helpful clue to Shelley's intentions.

SYLVA NORMAN

NIGHTMARES, by Bertrand Russell. *The Bodley Head.* 9*s.* 6*d.*

This book of scholarly diversions was published on the author's 82nd birthday. Although it follows a very successsful first volume of short stories, it would be possible I suppose for a disparaging person to congratulate the energy and achievement, but doubt whether it would have been published if presented by an unknown writer. The answer is that unfortunately it might not. 'Cassandra stuff', a silly young editor might have said, 'the old inverted Utopias; Aldous Huxley and Orwell did it long ago.' A very wise book would have been lost.

In fact these parables show extreme wit and vigour, are written in nervous and dignified English, and are amusingly topical. It is to be remembered also that Bertrand Russell was writing his unhysterical yet horrifying predictions of this planet's future long before even Mr. Huxley had written *Brave New World.* Here he has looked again and further into the murk, come back with sombre shadows to haunt him, and us, but remained essentially sane. The fictional form adds a little sugar.

The purpose of the 'Nightmares' is best explained in the author's words: "The man who wishes to preserve sanity in a dangerous world should summon in his mind a parliament of fears—in which each in turn is voted absurd by the others. The dreamers of these nightmares did not adopt this technique; it is to be hoped that the reader will have more wisdom!"

The dreamers include the Queen of Sheba, Mr. Bowdler (who "made the works of great men fit for little women"), an excellent metaphysician, and a severely exercised Eisenhower and Stalin; also psychoanalysts, mathematicians and others. Finally, the book includes two longer 'stories' of which the better is placed in a repulsive neo-Inca culture which has superseded our own and its successor. The hero overthrows the system of Zahatopolk, but only to start the whole wheel revolving again. For, as is the author's constant theme, "it is the fate of rebels to found new orthodoxies."

The second long story deals with the attraction for each other of two young people whose parents are responsible for wild and only too possible cults of near-religion. These have, at the inspiration of rival commercial interests, swept the insane world. Exposed, the false faiths crumble. But even married, the pair are still lost. Hearing from some underground chapel of the abolished sect the old hymn:

> Molybdenum of metals best
> Is good for high and low
> It cures diseases of the chest
> And makes the muscles grow . . .

the hero typically reflects: "Could I but return to the old sublimities! Ah, how hard is the Life of Reason!"

The nightmares are real enough for all thinking people. Bertrand Russell, with urbanity and authority, does, by his release of them, provide us at least with cartharsis and literary enjoyment. Seeing that, with all its virtues, the book is hardly likely to be a best seller, it is very modestly priced.

PENNETHORNE HUGHES

BOOKS ON THE TABLE

As the month's reading is being assembled, an essay by Lord Samuel on the use of judicious and correct quoting (a speech should avoid becoming an anthology, and it was not Shakespeare's lily that was gilded) is so much in anxious mind that the volume to which it is an introduction spontaneously leads the way.

The full man

It is VISCOUNT SAMUEL'S BOOK OF QUOTATIONS (*James Barrie.* 15*s.*), a new and much enlarged edition of the collection he made in 1947. For 64 years he has been noting passages; not necesssarily because he agrees with the opinions expressed, but rather that the pithy and emphatic style "may make them useful by challenging contradiction and provoking discussion." This selection from many thousands amply demonstrates these qualities, and especially noticeable are they in the all too infrequent extracts over the initial 'S'. Here are the "lightness, grace and spring" that inform debate in the Lords when 'S' is present. Subjects are arranged alphabetically, and their index and that of authors are helpfully separate, thus inviting investigation by those who need suggestions or stimulus. But primarily this is a book intended for the leisure hour, and what they will not see is the familiar and the hackneyed, as they turn the pages from 'Action' to 'Youth' finding, all the way, treasures provocative and profound.

Some more Victorians

Among them are five from Arthur Hugh Clough, before whose grave in Florence, accidentally come upon, I was ashamed to be able to recollect only that he wrote "Say not the struggle naught availeth" (too much of an anthology poem, with too many weak lines among the strong, for Viscount Samuel's quoting). The defect was remedied later—and more recently by the renewed interest in his friend Florence Nightingale whose cousin he married, and in Matthew Arnold whose tutor he was—but not so thoroughly as now, after reading THE DOCTOR'S DISCIPLES (*Oxford University Press.* 21*s.*); for Clough was one of the pupils of Thomas Arnold of Rugby whom Frances J. Woodward has chosen to study. The others are Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, Dean of Westminster, John Philip Gell, a pioneer of education in Van Diemen's Land, and William Delafield Arnold, the headmaster's fourth son who served among his other interests the same cause as Director of Public Instruction in India. These men, so diverse in character, were as diversely affected by Arnold, yet, the author says in her Preface, "that influence was the most important single factor in their lives." Because of this she includes a chapter on the Doctor himself, giving her readers leave to take or reject it. But they are advised not to omit it for, as an introduction to the four stories, it is too valuable an assessment of Arnold's philosophy, unformulated by himself, in the tracing of his disciples' future paths. Where he led them—as Jowett wrote, "not knowing where his ideas would take other people"—Miss Woodward seems to have quite brilliantly followed in delineation and in understanding. Free of the half-truths that mar Lytton Strachey's consideration of the Victorians, she has all his ability for keeping them vital, entertaining, real. Not guilty either of what she herself calls his "compassionate sneers", when she laughs it is with, and not at them.

Labelled 'Bloomsbury'

"It is somewhat unfortunate that his [Strachey's] popular reputation rests almost entirely upon his Victorian biographies, though, as we will see in a later chapter, there is more than enough material in these works to discredit the facile belief that he is merely an iconoclast," J. K. Johnstone claims in THE BLOOMSBURY GROUP (*Secker & Warburg.* 25*s.*), which encircled and enshrined E. M. Forster, Lytton Strachey, and Virginia Woolf. It con-

tained also John Maynard Keynes, Leonard Woolf, Vanessa (Virginia's sister) and Clive Bell, Duncan Grant and Roger Fry. They were united further in their friendship by a belief that art was all-important. Belonging to a "nucleus from which civilization has spread outwards" they represented aesthetic theory and art criticism, painting, economics, international affairs, communal psychology and literature;Dr. Johnstone deals mainly with the last and sets the values and composition of the novels and biographies of the leaders against the background of Bloomsbury philosophy. One is glad to have so exhaustive an analysis and appraisement of the output of the Forster-Strachey-Woolf trio ; some of it baffled, much of it was uncomplicatedly enjoyable, some of it seemed ephemeral, much of it fit to stand the test of time. The volume has revived memories and sharpened appreciation of works seen across a gulf wherein the standards set by the group have been further threatened — submerged to drowning point, you would think. Through Dr. Johnstone's fresher eyes it is both heartening and salutary to glimpse again their " common respect for the things of the spirit " and " a love of truth and beauty."

No " monstrous regiment "

Viginia Woolf is cited as one of the proofs of THE NATURAL SUPERIORITY OF WOMEN (*George Allen & Unwin.* 15*s.*) by Ashley Montagu, whose education has embraced the Universities of London, Florence and Columbia and who is now chairman of the Department of Anthropology at Rutgers. Such a wide preliminary sweep, and such a specialism in the foreground, demand serious consideration for his thesis, especially as it pleads for " more mutual love and understanding, and complete social equality of the sexes." Dr. Montagu feels that women are just about to emerge from the period of subjection by men, and instances the universal opening of doors to explain why hitherto there have been no female Leonardos, Michaelangelos, Shakespeares, Galileos, Bachs, Mozarts, Kants and Whiteheads. He is persuasive on biological facts and social consequences, on the intelligence of the sexes, on women and creativity, on the genius of them as the genius of humanity; indeed, his book, greeted with purrs, has been read with avidity by one member of the formerly inferior sex. Nevertheless, for her the argument remains unclinched until women are able to prevent the idiotic wars that are now begun by men; wars, moreover, in which woman herself is the chief sufferer. So far, she has knitted man's comforts, become a part of the same armed forces, written his " Battle Hymn of the Republic ", made his armaments, taken over his civilian job, washed his wounds, stood in pilgrimage over his graves, and watched life become either personally or vicariously a desert.

Puritan hangover

She of course predominates in the pew, and the work she does for the social and financial side helps to keep the churches open. R. C. Churchill would go further, and adds a plea to Ashley Montagu's when in THE ENGLISH SUNDAY (*Watts & Co.* 10*s.* 6*d.*), he claims that " if the Church of England really requires something to galvanize it, I can think of no more potent novelty than to make Christian Englishwomen true sharers with men in its ultimate destiny. After all, the present Queen is its titular head . . . " And he visualizes it appointing Miss Dorothy Sayers to a comfortable living, for he also thinks our popular religious writers could supply its need for manpower. "They should be told that it is their bounden duty not simply to write poems for the Christian press or poetic dramas to be performed in cathedrals, but to put their own shoulders to the wheel. . .For what is the point of a Christian literary revival that is almost divorced from the pulpit?" Lightheartedly, and at times facetiously, the author—himself a Congregationalist turned Agnostic—has still managed to produce a social document of significance. He discusses the churches' unwillingness to close empty ones as among the means of filling the rest; he discovers who lies under the English

Catholic, that we are still following ancient Israel, and is not surprised that "the same country should have produced both the hot-gospeller and hot music." Paganism or Protestantism, public and private morality, the Sunday newspaper, are some of the evidences that induce him to believe that our people, being no longer concerned with saving their souls, will go on being unconcerned.

The soul of Spain

That the ecclesiastical tribunal known as the Inquisition was not a Spanish institution, nor was its purpose the persecution of Jews and Moors, are two of the pieces of " practical advice for the traveller " given by Ignacio Olagüe in THIS IS SPAIN (*Cohen & West.* 12*s.* 6*d.*). Controversial ideas, however, do not prevent the book from " preparing the minds of those Europeans who were eager to catch a glimpse of modern Spain " ; this is Walter Starkie, the translator, in his Introduction. The historian author, trained biologist and palaeontologist too (and an attractive personality as presented by Professor Starkie), interprets the ancient land and civilization so that differences in provinces and character are intelligible to the visitor. The illustrations are good: here is Ecija, (where one learnt to pronounce it so easily as 'Ethica'); here are Toledo, Seville, Granada, Salamanca and Santander, and the Escorial, sierra country, and the bullfight — evoking sharp memories because their identities are individual and distinct. This is more than a guidebook (and less, for it lacks an index), because it cajoles a yearning to be back and should surely entice a host of newcomers.

The customs of the country

Two " pocket travel guides " FRANCE and THE BRITISH ISLES (*McGraw-Hill.* 15*s. each*), edited by Doré Ogrizek, are packed with information, " modern, streamlined, concise, for to-day's tourist," who is chiefly the one with the car whose " annual holidays last only three or four weeks." Even the currency of the countries is in pictures and this most sensibly; our figures on population, agriculture, industry, electric power, and all the rest, are graphed and marked with little drawings; our uniforms are in technicolour, and our celebrities are listed and photographed. Nor are the routine entries—maps of itineraries and outskirts, chapters on counties and provinces— omitted. The dictionary, the Preface and the Introduction are the only parts unillustrated, and, " seeing ourselves" being a national pastime, the last, in the British volume, was read with delight. From a fairly wide experience of hotel holidays and of the not-so-large restaurants, there comes no recollection of pickles or dumplings with meat; and not until now do we learn that " the roly-poly pudding is a real national dessert. " Sobering, complacency-routing though, is the realization that others see our cities as " monsters of ugliness ".

The Reader's Digest survey

Another kind of guide—to the " contemporary influences on urban life ", to a new region between " the use of leisure " and " the effectiveness of advertisement "—has been compiled by T. Cauter and J. S. Downham in THE COMMUNICATION OF IDEAS (*Chatto & Windus.* 25*s.*) The ' guinea pig ' is the city of Derby with its interests and activities, its social classes and their status. How many people react to the various " communication activities " and how widely their interests differ, it is the aim of this large volume to discern. Maps, charts, diagrams and statistics are copious, and much labour has gone into investigatory visiting and ' sampling '. Sir Arthur Bowley states in his Foreword that " accurate methods have been applied to this book, and the ordinary reader can depend on the judgment of the authors on the ' findings ' of the numerous analytical tables, while mathematicians will be able to test their validity." Such a survey in its economic, commercial and sociological aspects should have much to tell our planners— idealists and realists equally — of what our groundling habits are like and where our dormant inclinations lie.

GRACE BANYARD

PUBLISHED FOR THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW, LTD., BY HORACE MARSHALL & SON, LTD., Publishing Department, Temple House, Tallis Street, E.C.4.
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY GEERINGS OF ASHFORD, LTD., 80, HIGH STREET, ASHFORD, KENT.